Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

Mother, who spent greater time with the parties’ minor child, notified Father via certified letter of her intent to relocate out of state. Thirty-three days later, Father filed a petition in opposition to the move. The trial court allowed Father to oppose relocation, despite his failure to formally oppose the move within thirty days, noting that Mother had learned of Father’s opposition within the thirty-day period and that she had not relocated until “well after” Father filed his petition.
In this statutory construction case, we conclude that Tennessee’s parental relocation statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108, mandates that a parent wishing to oppose relocation file a petition in opposition within thirty days of receipt of notice of the proposed relocation. If no written petition in opposition is timely filed,the parent proposing to relocate with the child shall be permitted to do so, notwithstanding the absence of harm or prejudice to the relocating parent due to the untimely petition. Because Father failed to file a written petition in opposition to Mother’s proposed relocation within thirty days of receipt of her certified letter, we find the trial court erred in conducting any further analysis pursuant to section 36-6-108. The decision of the trial court is reversed, and Mother is permitted to relocate to Omaha, Nebraska, with the minor child. Father’s request for appellate attorney fees is denied, and all remaining issues are deemed pretermitted.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the calculation of jail credits. Henry J. Nagorny (“Nagorny”), an incarcerated individual, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court for Grainger County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to compel Sheriff Scott Layel to award him jail behavior credits that allegedly were due him. The Trial Court dismissed Nagorny’s petition, stating that the calculation of credits is an administrative matter. Nagorny filed an appeal to this Court. We hold that the record in this appeal is insufficient for proper appellate review. Namely, the Trial Court’s final order in the record before us apparently is incomplete and missing certain material. We remand to the Trial Court so that it may correct the defect in the record in keeping with our Opinion.

This appeal arises from a boundary line dispute. Appellees and Appellants both provided expert testimony and surveys from their respective surveyors. The trial court concluded that Appellees’ surveyor’s line was correct, and was not in conflict with the historic deeds. Accordingly, the court set the common boundary line between the parties’s properties in compliance with Appellees’ survey. In addition to the competing surveys, the court based its decision, in part, upon Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-2-109, which creates a presumption of ownership in a party who has paid taxes on property for more than twenty years. Based upon tax records, the court determined that Appellees had paid the property taxes on the disputed property for the relevant statutory period. Appellants appeal. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s determinations. Affirmed and remanded.

This appeal involves a dispute over property allegedly owned by a partnership. The plaintiff and defendant lived together for about six years but never married. It is undisputed that they formed a partnership during that time for the purpose of buying and selling real estate. The parties bought, renovated, and sold numerous properties, and after they separated, they equally split the remaining profits from the property sales. However, they could not agree as to who owned the house where the parties were currently living and various items of personal property acquired during their relationship. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that all of the disputed property was partnership property and that each party held a one-half undivided interest in the property. Accordingly, the court declared that the parties owned the disputed real property as tenants in common, and it awarded the plaintiff a judgment for one-half of the value of certain personal property. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiff. The court further concluded that the defendant had fraudulently conveyed partnership property to her father, a co-defendant, and the court set aside the sale and held that the defendant was responsible for repaying to her father the amount he paid for the fraudulently conveyed property. The defendants appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the cause for further proceedings.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services sought to terminate the parental rights of Robert E. and Susan E. to James C. E. The trial court terminated Robert E.’s parental rights, finding that he had abandoned James C. E. and that termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of James C. E. Robert E. appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This case involves an appeal by a mother of the termination of her parental rights to her daughter. We conclude that the grounds for termination have been established by clear and convincing evidence. Further, there is clear and convincing evidence in the record that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This case presents the issue of whether proper service of process was accomplished regarding the defendant, Saeed Etezadi, M.D. Plaintiff, Will J. Milton, filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. Etezadi on April 14, 2003. The complaint and summons were served upon Dr. Etezadi’s office manager, with a notation appearing on the summons that service was accepted as “agent.” Dr. Etezadi filed an answer which, inter alia, raised the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process. Mr. Milton voluntarily dismissed that action and subsequently re-filed within one year of the non-suit. In connection with the second action, the complaint and summons were allegedly served upon Dr. Etezadi at his office. Dr. Etezadi filed an Answer, again raising the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process. Dr. Etezadi also asserted that all applicable statutes of limitation and repose had expired. He later filed a motion to dismiss. Following the hearing, the trial court dismissed the claims against Dr. Etezadi, finding that there was no service of process in either action. Mr. Milton appeals. We affirm.

The final judgment from which the appellant seeks to appeal was entered on December 3, 2012. The only Notice of Appeal “filed” by the appellant on December 28, 2012, was submitted to the trial court clerk via facsimile transmission in violation of Rule 5A.02(4)(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the Notice of Appeal was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, this appeal is dismissed.

This is the second appeal of a post-divorce decision concerning child support. In the first appeal, we determined that the trial court erred in failing to make the required findings to justify an upward deviation in child support, thus we vacated the award of child support and remanded for a determination of the appropriate amount. Following the hearing on remand, the trial court set the appropriate amount of child support and determined that Father had overpaid child support. The court did not award Father a judgment or credit in the amount of his overpayment, and Father appeals. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award Father a credit or judgment in the amount of his overpayment.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court concluded that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the grounds that Mother was incarcerated under a sentence of more than 10 years and her child was under the age of eight at time of sentencing, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6), and that Mother was convicted of the intentional and wrongful death of the child's other parent, see Tenn. Code Ann.  36-1-113(g)(7). Mother appeals. We affirm.

Executrix of an estate filed a complaint against the officers of a corporation in an effort to pierce the corporate veil and recover a debt she alleges is due from the corporation to the estate of her late husband. The trial court granted her motion for summary judgment and awarded her a $52,000 judgment. The individuals appealed, asserting genuine issues of material fact should have precluded the trial court’s award. We conclude the trial court erred in awarding damages at the summary judgment stage because material facts are in dispute regarding whether a debt actually exists and regarding the amount of money that is at issue.
 

I write separately to address two issues. The first pertains to jury instruction T.P.I. 11.15 and the failure to give a curative instruction when requested by the jury.