Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

In this case, Plaintiff filed a petition for criminal contempt against Counsel, alleging that Counsel allowed Defendant to portray herself as unrepresented when Counsel assisted her with her testimony and pleadings. The court dismissed the petition, finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the motion when Plaintiff had alleged an ethical violation that did not rise to the level of criminal contempt. The court also denied a subsequent motion to alter or amend its judgment and a motion for recusal. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
 

Donald Hughes and Donna Hughes (“Plaintiffs”) sued Clifford R. Barbee and Anna Melissa Barbee (“Defendants”) seeking, among other things, an order restraining Defendants from obstructing an alleged public roadway. After a trial the Trial Court entered its order on May 29, 2012 finding and holding, inter alia, that the road at issue “was a public road which had been in existence (and used by the public) for a number of years,” that Defendants had failed to prove that the road had been abandoned, and that the road was to “be opened for use by the public.” Defendants appeal to this Court. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings, and we affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Wesley S. (“the Child”), the minor child of Wesley K.S. (“Father”) and Kari F. (“Mother”). The parents were runaway teenagers when the Child was born in August 2007. Father was incarcerated several times during the Child’s first two years. Father’s latest incarceration began on May 14, 2009, and  he has been in jail continuously since that date. The Child was taken into custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on December 17, 2010. On May 31, 2012, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father. The sole ground alleged was abandonment, based on his conduct prior to incarceration exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the Child. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had abandoned the Child due to his pre- incarceration conduct. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the Child’s best interest. Father has appealed. We affirm.

The trial court awarded Defendants summary judgment in this action for legal malpractice. We affirm based on expiry of the applicable statute of limitations.

Two inmates in the custody of the Department of Correction have filed a notice of appeal from an order entered on January 4, 2013, denying their post-judgment motions. Because the inmates did not file their notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.
 

General contractor filed breach of contract action against homeowners, alleging the homeowners failed to pay invoices on an extensive home renovation project. The homeowners denied there were outstanding invoices and filed counterclaims for breach of contract and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act against the general contractor and its owner, in his individual capacity, who contractually agreed to supervise the project for an additional fee. The homeowners alleged the general contractor failed to perform the contract in a workmanlike manner; they also asserted a claim against the owner asserting that he agreed to personally supervise the project for a percentage of the contract and that he breached his agreement by failing to properly supervise the work. The trial court, Judge Barbara Haynes presiding, awarded summary judgment to the homeowners on all claims and counterclaims. On the homeowners’ counterclaims, Judge Haynes also awarded treble damages, attorney’s fees, and costs, pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The counter-defendants filed a motion to alter or amend the decision as to the counterclaims; however, Judge Haynes retired before ruling on the motion. The case was then assigned to Judge Hamilton Gayden and, following a hearing, he denied the motion to alter or amend. The counter-defendants appealed. We affirm the summary dismissal of the general contractor’s breach of contract claim for it is undisputed the homeowners paid the contract amount in full. As for the homeowners’ counterclaims, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the homeowners on their breach of contract claim against the general contractor and the award of damages for failing to perform the contract in a workmanlike manner. We also affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the homeowners against the supervisor for failing to properly supervise the work; however, we find the evidence insufficient to establish the damages that proximately resulted from the supervisor’s breach as distinguished from the damages resulting from the general contractor’s breach. As for the homeowners’ claims that the general contractor and the supervisor violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, we have determined there are material facts in dispute concerning whether the contractor or the supervisor used or employed unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the TCPA; therefore, summary judgment as to the TCPA claims was not appropriate. We, therefore, reverse the grant of summary judgment on the TCPA claims as to the contractor and the supervisor and remand these claims, and the determination of damages for failing to properly supervise, for further proceedings.

Mother appeals the trial court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child, the parenting plan, and the division of marital property. The trial court found that the majority of the factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106 weighed equally in favor of both parents but designated Father as the primary residential parent primarily because the court awarded Father the marital residence, which provides stability for the child. The trial court, however, did not make any findings concerning a wealth of evidence of physical and emotional abuse by Father, some of which Father admitted, and we have determined that the preponderance of the evidence established that Father was abusive of Mother, sometimes in the child’s presence. Because Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-406(a) mandates that a parent’s parenting time shall be limited if the parent is found to have engaged in abuse, we reverse the designation of Father as the primary residential parent, as well as the parenting plan adopted by the court, and remand with instructions to designate Mother as the primary residential parent and establish a new parenting plan considering all applicable factors. As for the division of the marital estate, the trial court awarded Father 68% of the marital estate and Mother 32%, which Mother contends is inequitable. She asserts the inequitable distribution is due to Father being awarded the marital residence, which was unencumbered and valued at $216,000, with Mother receiving $55,000, being 26% of the equity, as her share of the marital residence. Considering the length of the marriage, that each spouse contributed substantially to satisfying the mortgage on the residence, and the relatively equal earning capacities of the parties, inter alia, we have determined it is inequitable to award Father 74% of the equity in the marital residence, the result of which awards him 68% of the marital estate. Therefore, we remand with instructions to modify the award by ordering Father to pay Mother $97,200, instead of $55,000, for her interest in the marital residence. As for attorney’s fees, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Father’s request for his attorney’s fees at trial and we deny each party’s request for attorneys’ fees on appeal.

In suit to recover rent due and owing under a lease agreement in which a corporation was named as tenant, trial court entered judgment in favor of landlord against individual who had signed the lease in the space in the signature box designated “Tenant.” Individual appeals, contending that his signature on the lease is not sufficient to bind him personally to the obligations under the lease. Landlord appeals award of damages. We affirm the holding that the individual’s signature on the lease renders him personally liable and remand the case for a determination of whether the landlord is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest and for an award of attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal.
 

Doctor sued Seller of medical equipment for a refund of the purchase price of the equipment pursuant to a money back guarantee; Seller counterclaimed for attorney’s fees and litigation costs pursuant to a separate purchase agreement. The trial court granted Seller’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the guarantee on the basis that Doctor failed to meet a condition precedent; the trial court also granted Doctor’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to Seller’s request for fees and costs on the basis that the guarantee and the purchase agreement were separate contracts. Doctor and Seller appeal. Finding no error, we affirm both judgments.
 

 This appeal arises from a prolonged divorce action. On appeal, Father challenges the trial court’s determinations regarding parenting time, child support, alimony, and the division of the marital estate. Father further challenges the trial court’s decision finding him in both civil and criminal contempt. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal involves a lawsuit against a bank. Representing himself, the plaintiff customer filed this lawsuit against the defendant bank. The defendant bank filed a motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff customer filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the customer’s motion for summary judgment and granted the bank’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiff customer now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

These personal injury cases against Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., and Ford Motor Company (collectively "the Defendants") were consolidated below for all pre-trial proceedings. They have been before this court twice before, first pursuant to a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 extraordinary appeal and later by way of a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal. They have generated two published opinions. In re Bridgestone/Firestone and Ford Motor Company Tire Litigation, 138 S.W.3d 202 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), perm. app. den. Jun. 1, 2004 ("Firestone I"); In re Bridgestone/Firestone and Ford Motor Company Litigation, 286 S.W.3d 898 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008), perm. app. den. Mar. 23, 2009 ("Firestone II"). In Firestone I, we held that these cases should have been filed in Mexico. We dismissed them on the ground of forum non conveniens. In Firestone II, we held that unsuccessful attempts to file in Mexico could possibly establish that Mexico was not an available alternative forum,contrary to the assumption made by us in Firestone I. We remanded the cases for a hearing on the issue of whether the dismissals in Mexico took place in spite of the plaintiffs’ good faith efforts or, rather, occurred because of the plaintiffs’ manipulation of the cases in order to secure the dismissals in Mexico and thereby have an excuse to refile in Tennessee. The trial court dismissed eight of 26 pending cases. The cases that were dismissed fall into two distinct groups. One group involves tires ("the FR 480 tire cases"), specifically Firestone 480 tires, that were actually manufactured in Mexico. The trial court concluded that the failure to join the entity in Mexico that actually made the tires there showed that the plaintiffs in those cases should not be permitted to litigate whether Mexico was an available forum. The other group consists of two cases which were filed in Mexico on more than one occasion, only one of which was disclosed in discovery ("the Ramirez and Flores cases"). The plaintiffs in both groups (collectively "the Plaintiffs") appeal. We affirm.