Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on January 2, 2013. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to four children were terminated based on findings that they committed severe child abuse upon a sibling and that the best interests of the remaining four children (the parents’ rights to the two severely abused children having been previously surrendered) required termination of their rights. Parents appealed, challenging only the best interest finding. We affirm.

The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against numerous healthcare providers. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and -122. The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the action with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

A woman who was severely injured in a collision with an automobile driven by an unlicensed minor filed suit against the minor. The minor’s parents’ insurance company denied coverage and refused to defend the suit on the basis of an exclusion in the insurance policy for damages caused by a party driving without permission of the owner or a person “in lawful possession” of the vehicle. No defense was offered, and the injured party obtained a $1 million default judgment against the minor driver. The injured party and the minor’s parents then jointly filed suit against the insurance company, alleging that the insurance company was liable for breach of contract, bad faith, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and violation of the Unfair Claims Practices Act based upon its denial of coverage. The trial court ruled that, as a matter of law, the minor was entitled to insurance coverage under her parents’ policy at the time of the accident. The remainder of the case was tried, and the plaintiffs were awarded compensatory and punitive damages on the bad faith claim. The jury also found the insurance company had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and the trial court trebled the compensatory damages and awarded attorney fees under the Act. The insurance company has raised a number of issues in this appeal, inter alia, the grant of partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the question of coverage; the finding of liability for bad faith, the liability and enhanced penalty under the TCPA, and the requirement that plaintiffs should make an election between the punitive damages and the enhanced damages. We affirm the breach of contract holding, including the conclusion that the policy terms provided coverage. We reverse and vacate the holding of liability for bad faith, including the award of punitive damages thereunder, since the statutory cause of action was not plead. We also reverse the award of treble damages under the TCPA, but affirm the finding of a violation of the Act. We affirm as modified the award of attorneys’ fees.
 

Plaintiff Bank accelerated a loan secured by an aircraft after Borrower failed to maintain insurance on the aircraft as required by the loan documents. Bank filed an action to collect amounts due; took possession of and disposed of the aircraft; and sought a judgment for the deficiency. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Bank. Defendant Loan Guarantors appeal. We affirm in part; reverse in part, finding that Bank did not provide sufficient notice as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-9-611; and remand for further proceedings.

The appellant, Linda Gass (“Heir”), an heir to the Estate of Tandy Nathan Dalton, appeals from an order of the trial court entered on October 30, 2012, which determined that certain specifically described real property upon which Heir lives is an asset of the estate and may be sold by the appellee, Barbara D. Carmichael, the Executrix of the decedent’s estate (“Executrix”), pursuant to the terms of the decedent’s will. Because it is clear that the jurisdiction of this Court was not invoked properly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

This is the second appeal in an action seeking settlement agreements and settlement reports from Corrections Corporation of America pursuant to the Public Records Act, Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-301 et seq. In the first appeal, this court determined that CCA is the functional equivalent of a governmental entity in operating correctional facilities and remanded the action to the trial court to determine whether the documents requested by the petitioner fell within the statutory definition of public records set forth at Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-301. On remand, CCA refused to turn over two categories of documents, settlement agreements and settlement reports, arising out of inmate litigation, arguing that they did not fall within the statutory definition of public records and are confidential. CCA additionally argued that the settlement reports are protected as attorney work product. The trial court held that both the settlement agreements and reports are public records, that the settlement reports do not constitute attorney work product, that CCA is required to produce the settlement agreements and reports, and that the petitioner is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-505(g). We affirm the finding that the settlement agreements are public records and that CCA is required to produce the settlement agreements. We also affirm the trial court’s findings that the settlement reports are public records and that CCA has failed to demonstrate that the settlement reports were produced “in anticipation of litigation;” therefore, the reports are not attorney work product and CCA must produce the reports. Further, we affirm the award of attorney’s fees incurred at trial that pertained to requiring CCA to produce the settlement agreements. Finally, we find the petitioner is entitled to recover attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal to the extent they pertain to the settlement agreements, but not the settlement reports. On remand, the trial court shall make the appropriate award.

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to his child, who was born addicted to drugs and with extensive medical needs, on the ground of persistence of conditions; Father, who was incarcerated when the child was born, appeals, contending that the termination of his rights is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We have determined that the evidence shows that the Father’s lack of participation in the care of the child and the treatment of the child’s medical needs constitutes neglect; that the neglect persists and is reasonably probable to continue; that it will not be remedied; and that continuation of the relationship would put the child at further risk, thereby diminishing the child’s complete integration into a safe and stable home. Consequently, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.
 

In this case involving serious injuries sustained in a collision between a school bus and a pickup truck, the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. We must, therefore, reverse the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
 

I must respectfully dissent in part from the majority opinion in this case. In the majority opinion, the majority states the issue raised by the Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) as: “Whether the trial court erred in holding that the Dyer County Zoning Resolution does not require an applicant seeking a variance to have a written lease.” In a footnote, the majority observes that the appellate record contained “no such finding by the circuit court.” Instead of leaving it at that, the majority goes on to “construe the BZA’s argument as ‘Whether the Resolution requires an applicant seeking a variance to possess a valid lease.’ ”

Diane Benson and the Northwest Tennessee Shooting Sports Association filed requests for variances to devote property to a Use Permitted on Appeal within a Forestry-Agricultural-
Residential-District in Dyersburg. Mrs. Benson’s request was tabled, but the NTSSA’s request was ultimately granted. Mrs. Benson, along with two others, filed a petition for writ of certiorari and for declaratory judgment. Appellees filed motions to dismiss, which the trial court granted. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the declaratory judgment action and we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Mary Kruger and Kurt Kruger’s petition for writ of certiorari. However, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to Mrs. Benson’s claim that the BZA acted illegally, arbitrarily or capriciously, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.