Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

Rose A. Chapman and Alfred C. Chapman (“Plaintiffs”) sued Wellmont Holston Valley Medical Center (“the Hospital”) regarding a fall Ms. Chapman suffered while a patient at the Hospital. The Trial Court entered judgment upon the jury’s verdict finding and holding that the Hospital was not at fault. Plaintiffs appeal raising one issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in granting the Hospital’s motion in limine to exclude testimony about an apology and offer to pay bills allegedly made by one of the Hospital’s nurses. We find this issue has been waived, and we affirm.

In this action plaintiff charged defendant had breached the contract between them and sought specific performance. The Trial Court held the contracts were ambiguous and construed them in accordance with the actions the parties took in regard to the contracts. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the defendant and dismissed the Complaint, but refused to award the prevailing party attorney's fees as was required in the parties' contract. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's Judgment, but modify and remand, with instructions to the Trial Court to award the prevailing party her attorney's fees.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

An employee of NES married a co-worker’s daughter and was found by the NES civil service board to be in violation of the utility’s nepotism policy that precluded related employees from working in the same “section.” The employee sought judicial review, and the trial court reversed the administrative decision. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because the administrative decision was arbitrary and capricious.

The parents of two young children agreed to give the paternal grandparents custody of the children. The grandparents subsequently filed a petition for termination of their parental rights on the ground of abandonment, and for adoption. The father agreed to surrender his rights during the hearing on the termination petition, but the mother insisted that she had not abandoned her children. The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to pay financial support in the four months prior to the filing of the petition for termination. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1). Mother appealed. She acknowledges that she failed to pay support during the relevant period, but she insists that her failure was not willful. We affirm the trial court.

Purchaser of condominium at delinquent tax sale sought excess funds remaining after taxes and court costs had been paid. Purchaser prepared a Quitclaim Deed that transferred Taxpayer’s title and redemption rights in property to Purchaser. Purchaser next prepared a Deed of Correction that corrected the spelling of Taxpayer’s name, but that also included a clause purporting to transfer to Purchaser Taxpayer’s right to the excess funds. Purchaser then prepared an Assignment of Excess Funds Payout that also purported to transfer Taxpayer’s right to the excess funds to Purchaser. Trial court awarded excess funds to Taxpayer rather than to Purchaser after finding there was no meeting of the minds and that Purchaser failed to carry his burden of proving he provided consideration for Taxpayer’s conveyance of the excess funds to him. Purchaser appealed and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We conclude there was no consideration for the Assignment of Excess Funds Payoutand that the Deed of Correction is unenforceable because it is beyond the expectations of an ordinary person for a document titled Deed of Correction to transfer a right to receive $14,000 of excess funds to a purchaser of property.

I agree fully with the majority’s analysis in this case. I concur separately only to add a comment as to the portion of the opinion on the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Appellant corporation appeals the trial court’s rulings finding it liable for breach of contract damages, prejudgment interest, and damages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act. Additionally, the corporation’s president appeals the trial court’s action in piercing the corporate veil to hold him personally liable for the contract damages. We reverse the trial court’s finding with regard to veil piercing, but affirm the trial court in all other respects.

This appeal involves an inmate’s petition for common law writ of certiorari. The petitioner inmate was convicted of disciplinary offenses by the respondent prison disciplinary board. The inmate filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari, seeking judicial review of the convictions for the disciplinary offenses. The trial court found that the inmate’s petition was not timely filed, and therefore that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the petition. We affirm.