Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

This appeal involves claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and misappropriation of image. The plaintiff, a customer of the defendant store, brought clothing into the store’s dressing room to try it on. While in a state of undress in the dressing room, the customer noticed in the reflection of her dressing-room mirror a globe on the store ceiling that appeared to contain a surveillance camera. Store employees initially told the customer that the globe contained a camera, but a store manager later told the customer that the ceiling globe did not contain a camera. Eventually, the plaintiff customer filed this lawsuit against the defendant store, seeking damages for, inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and misappropriation of image. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant store. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse, finding that the standard for summary judgment under Hannan v. Alltel Publishing has not been met in this case.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which Guardian, along with Custodial Parent, sought to terminate the parental rights of Father to the Child. Following a hearing, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights, finding that Father abandoned the Child by failing to visit and by failing to provide child support and a suitable home; that the conditions which led to removal persisted; and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.

The Bureau of TennCare filed a petition to open Fred F. Crumley, Sr.’s estate in order to file a claim against the estate for medical assistance rendered. The court appointed an administrator, and the Bureau of TennCare filed a claim. Administrator argued that the statute of limitations barred recovery on any claim filed by the Bureau of TennCare. The trial court agreed with Administrator and dismissed the claim. The Bureau of TennCare appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

In this action the defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds the statute of limitation had run on plaintiff's cause of action. The Trial Court overruled the Motion on the grounds that the tolling provisions in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(c) was applicable to GTLA actions and granted permission to appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. On appeal, we hold that the tolling provision does not apply because the statute did not expressly extend it to GTLA actions.

This is a termination of parental rights case involving the biological father, David R. (“Father”), of the minor child, Leland C.L. The child was taken into custody on June 14, 2010, at two months of age, due to the biological mother’s drug use and the fact that he tested positive for opiates and hydrocodone at birth. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights naming the father as a respondent on January 7, 2011. Following a bench trial, the Court granted the Petition upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the father had abandoned the child by failing to provide a suitable home for him, and also that the father was in substantial noncompliance with his permanency plans. The Court further found that termination was in the child’s best interest. The father appeals. We affirm.

Plaintiff's action for retaliatory discharge resulted in a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and an award of $120,000.00. Defendant appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court upholding the jury verdict.

This appeal involves claims against a decedent’s estate. After claims were filed against the decedent’s estate, the co-executors filed exceptions to the claim and attached a letter previously sent to the claimant discussing their objections to the claims. The probate court held that the co-executors had excepted to the claims only on the basis of timeliness, and that objections in the attached letter would not be considered additional exceptions. The co-executors argued that the claims were void and unenforceable irrespective of whether exceptions were filed; the probate court did not expressly rule on this contention. The claims against the estate were found to be timely filed, so the claims were reduced to judgments against the estate without a hearing on their merits. The co-executors appeal. We affirm in part and remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52.01 on the issue of whether the claims against the estate are unenforceable or void on their face.

Former owner of condominium unit whose unit was ordered sold after being determined, due to unsanitary conditions and offensive odors, to constitute a nuisance, appeals the trial court’s order permanently enjoining her from acquiring a unit in the condominium. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

This is a grandparent visitation case, in which Mother appeals the trial court’s award of specific visitation to Appellee grandparents under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6306. Specifically, Mother argues that the trial court incorrectly determined that she opposed visitation, that she had failed to rebut the presumption of substantial harm under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-306(b)(4),and that grandparent visitation was in the children’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Sarah Hurst (“Hurst”) sued Colman S. Hochman (“Hochman”) and Hochman Family Partners, L.P. (“the Partnership”) alleging that Hochman had committed a battery upon her, and seeking damages for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress among other things. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Decree that, inter alia, awarded Hurst damages of $2,500 against Hochman for battery; denied Hurst’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, discrimination under the Fair Housing Act, and punitive damages; and dismissed Hurst’s claims against the Partnership. Hurst appeals raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in denying her claim of discrimination under the Fair Housing Act and in dismissing her claims against the Partnership. We affirm.