Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

I write separately to address two issues. The first pertains to jury instruction T.P.I. 11.15 and the failure to give a curative instruction when requested by the jury.

In this condemnation action, the condemning authority appeals the jury’s valuation of property taken and award of compensation to landowner. Finding that the valuation of the property is within the range of opinions of fair market value testified to at trial, that the jury was properly instructed, and that the court’s conduct of the trial was proper, we affirm the judgment entered upon the jury’s verdict.

Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights with respect to the six children at issue in this appeal. She concedes that grounds exist for termination, but she claims that termination is not in the children’s best interest. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is divorce case pertaining to the marriage of Carrie Mobley (“Mother”) and Mark Adam Mobley (“Father”). The parties were married for 15 years. They have three minor daughters (collectively “Children”). Following a two-day trial, the court divorced the parties, divided their marital property, and made decrees regarding the custody of the Children. With respect to the Children, the trial court designated Father as the primary residential parent; it then ordered a 50/50 shared residential parenting arrangement. Following the divorce, the court found Mother to be in willful contempt of multiple provisions of its judgment. It sentenced her to ten days in jail on each of five counts. The court suspended the sentences on condition that there be no further violations. Mother appeals. She challenges the trial court’s judgment as to (1) the designation of Father as the primary residential parent, (2) portions of the residential parenting schedule, and (3) the inclusion of a “paramour provision” in the divorce judgment. In addition, she appeals the contempt findings, sentences, and award of fees to Father on the contempt proceedings. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

This case involves the construction of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. Father appeals the transfer of his case from circuit court to chancery court, the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for a declaratory judgment, and the trial court’s ruling finding him in breach of the post-majority support provision of the marital dissolution agreement and awarding Mother attorney fees. We reverse as to the attorney fee award, but affirm as to the remainder.

At the time of the parties’ divorce, both parties lived in Tennessee, and Mother was named primary residential parent. Shortly thereafter, Mother was allowed to relocate to Georgia with the children, and Father’s requests that he be named primary residential parent were denied. Following the move, the parties were unable to agree to a parenting plan, and the circuit court resolved the remaining parenting issues and transferred future disputes to Georgia. On appeal, the pro se parties raise numerous issues related to various decisions of the trial court. We affirm in part and we reverse in part, and we remand for further proceedings.

This appeal concerns an overcollection of child support by the State in a Title IV-D matter. Anthony Phillips (“Father”) and Suzanna R. Phillips (“Mother”) divorced, and Father was ordered to pay child support. Later, Father’s child support obligation was suspended on account of his disability status. The State of Tennessee (“the State”) garnished Father’s Social Security checks to satisfy an arrearage. The Chancery Court for Monroe County (“the Trial Court”) found that Father had paid his arrears and, in fact, had overpaid. The Trial Court ordered the State to reimburse Father the overpayment and to pursue Mother for the overpayment sum. The State appeals, arguing that the Trial Court lacked authority because of the State’s sovereign immunity to render such an order. We affirm as modified.

This appeal involves the interpretation of a commercial lease. The lease gave the plaintiff tenant two successive options to extend the term of the lease, provided the tenant gave timely notice of its intent to exercise the renewal option. The tenant exercised the first renewal option, but did not give timely notice of intent to exercise the second option. The lease also contained language giving the tenant a grace period to exercise the option if the lessor gave notice that the lessor had not received notice of renewal. The lessor did not give the written notice to the tenant. The tenant filed a lawsuit against the defendant lessor, seeking a declaratory judgment and damages for breach of contract. The plaintiff tenant asserted in the lawsuit that the tenant had the grace period to exercise the renewal option because the lease required the lessor to give written notice, and the lessor had failed to do so. Both parties filed dispositive motions based on their interpretations of the lease. Construing the lease, the trial court held that the grace period was never triggered so the tenant’s renewal option lapsed and granted a judgment in favor of the lessor. The tenant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from the circuit court’s dismissal of Appellant’s appeal from general sessions court. Upon filing the appeal, Appellant paid costs in the general sessions court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 8–21–401(b)(1)(C)(i), but did not submit a surety bond under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-5-103. The circuit court held that failure to post the surety bond under Section 27-5-103 resulted in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the circuit court. Accordingly, the trial court granted Appellees’s motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Based upon this Court’s recent decision in Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC, No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013), we reverse the dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to visit, contending that her failure to visit the children was not willful and that termination of her parental rights was not in the children’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment terminating her parental rights.

The trial court granted summary judgment to a judgment creditor of the decedent’s estate on a claim that the decedent fraudulently deeded an interest in real property to his wife so she would receive it free from the claims of his legitimate creditors after his death. The trial court’s judgment was based on circumstances surrounding the property transfer that satisfied the elements of fraudulent conveyance under both Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-3-305(a)(1) and (a)(2). The widow denies that there was any fraudulent intent behind the transfer of the disputed property to her, but insists that it arose naturally from the love and affection that existed between husband and wife. We affirm the trial court.