Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

This is a surveyor negligence case. Appellee developer filed suit against Appellant surveyor, claiming two distinct acts of negligence on surveyor’s part. The first claim of negligence involved an error allegedly made by surveyor in a 1993 survey. The second claim of negligence involved Appellee’s claim that, upon discovering the 1993 survey error in a subsequent survey that it performed in 2002, surveyor had a duty to inform Appellee of the error. We conclude that any negligence arising from the 1993 survey claim is barred by the statute of repose, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-114(a). Despite Appellant’s numerous motions to exclude this cause of action as time barred, the trial court ultimately allowed the 1993 negligent survey claim to be tried to the jury. The jury was then instructed as to both claims of negligence and the jury returned a verdict, wherein it found Appellant surveyor to be forty percent at fault and awarded damages in favor of Appellee. Appellant surveyor appeals. Because the jury was improperly instructed and was allowed to consider the time-barred claim of negligence, we conclude that the jury was mislead by the instructions. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment on the jury verdict and remand for a new trial. Vacated and remanded.

In this case, the majority concludes that the plaintiffs’ payment of $211.50 to the General Sessions Court clerk satisfied the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103, and therefore, that the Circuit Court erred in dismissing their appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In reaching this conclusion, the majority relies upon the recent case of Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC, No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013). Because I believe Bernatsky is based upon a flawed premise, I respectfully dissent.

In this case, we address the bond requirements for an appeal from General Sessions Court to Circuit Court. The plaintiff property owners were leasing commercial space to the defendant. The plaintiffs filed a forcible entry and detainer action against the defendant in General Sessions Court. During the pendency of the proceedings, the plaintiffs allegedly locked the defendant out of the property prematurely, causing property damage to the defendant. The defendant then filed a cross-claim in the original General Sessions Court lawsuit for unlawful ouster. The defendant also filed a separate action in the General Sessions Court based on the same allegations of unlawful ouster. The General Sessions Court consolidated the two cases for trial. Ultimately, the General Sessions Court held in favor of the plaintiffs on their forcible entry and detainer claim and awarded attorney fees under the lease. As to the defendant’s cross-claim and separate lawsuit based on unlawful ouster, the General Sessions Court found in favor of the defendant and awarded damages. The plaintiffs sought a de novo appeal to Circuit Court of the rulings in favor of the defendant on his cross-claim and separate claim; the defendant appealed the Circuit Court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiffs. In doing so, all of the appellants — the plaintiffs and the defendant — filed notices of appeal and paid $211.50 to the General Sessions Court clerk, pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i). None of the appellants filed any further bond at that time. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ appeals, arguing that the Circuit Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because they had not complied with the appeal-bond requirement in T.C.A. § 27-5-103. The Circuit Court granted the motion and dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeals. The Circuit Court also dismissed the defendant’s appeal sua sponte based on the same reasoning. The plaintiffs now appeal to this Court. We reverse the Circuit Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ appeals in light of our recent decision Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC, No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013), and remand for further proceedings.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on January 2, 2013. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to four children were terminated based on findings that they committed severe child abuse upon a sibling and that the best interests of the remaining four children (the parents’ rights to the two severely abused children having been previously surrendered) required termination of their rights. Parents appealed, challenging only the best interest finding. We affirm.

The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against numerous healthcare providers. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and -122. The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the action with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

A woman who was severely injured in a collision with an automobile driven by an unlicensed minor filed suit against the minor. The minor’s parents’ insurance company denied coverage and refused to defend the suit on the basis of an exclusion in the insurance policy for damages caused by a party driving without permission of the owner or a person “in lawful possession” of the vehicle. No defense was offered, and the injured party obtained a $1 million default judgment against the minor driver. The injured party and the minor’s parents then jointly filed suit against the insurance company, alleging that the insurance company was liable for breach of contract, bad faith, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and violation of the Unfair Claims Practices Act based upon its denial of coverage. The trial court ruled that, as a matter of law, the minor was entitled to insurance coverage under her parents’ policy at the time of the accident. The remainder of the case was tried, and the plaintiffs were awarded compensatory and punitive damages on the bad faith claim. The jury also found the insurance company had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and the trial court trebled the compensatory damages and awarded attorney fees under the Act. The insurance company has raised a number of issues in this appeal, inter alia, the grant of partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the question of coverage; the finding of liability for bad faith, the liability and enhanced penalty under the TCPA, and the requirement that plaintiffs should make an election between the punitive damages and the enhanced damages. We affirm the breach of contract holding, including the conclusion that the policy terms provided coverage. We reverse and vacate the holding of liability for bad faith, including the award of punitive damages thereunder, since the statutory cause of action was not plead. We also reverse the award of treble damages under the TCPA, but affirm the finding of a violation of the Act. We affirm as modified the award of attorneys’ fees.
 

Plaintiff Bank accelerated a loan secured by an aircraft after Borrower failed to maintain insurance on the aircraft as required by the loan documents. Bank filed an action to collect amounts due; took possession of and disposed of the aircraft; and sought a judgment for the deficiency. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Bank. Defendant Loan Guarantors appeal. We affirm in part; reverse in part, finding that Bank did not provide sufficient notice as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-9-611; and remand for further proceedings.

The appellant, Linda Gass (“Heir”), an heir to the Estate of Tandy Nathan Dalton, appeals from an order of the trial court entered on October 30, 2012, which determined that certain specifically described real property upon which Heir lives is an asset of the estate and may be sold by the appellee, Barbara D. Carmichael, the Executrix of the decedent’s estate (“Executrix”), pursuant to the terms of the decedent’s will. Because it is clear that the jurisdiction of this Court was not invoked properly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

This is the second appeal in an action seeking settlement agreements and settlement reports from Corrections Corporation of America pursuant to the Public Records Act, Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-301 et seq. In the first appeal, this court determined that CCA is the functional equivalent of a governmental entity in operating correctional facilities and remanded the action to the trial court to determine whether the documents requested by the petitioner fell within the statutory definition of public records set forth at Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-301. On remand, CCA refused to turn over two categories of documents, settlement agreements and settlement reports, arising out of inmate litigation, arguing that they did not fall within the statutory definition of public records and are confidential. CCA additionally argued that the settlement reports are protected as attorney work product. The trial court held that both the settlement agreements and reports are public records, that the settlement reports do not constitute attorney work product, that CCA is required to produce the settlement agreements and reports, and that the petitioner is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-505(g). We affirm the finding that the settlement agreements are public records and that CCA is required to produce the settlement agreements. We also affirm the trial court’s findings that the settlement reports are public records and that CCA has failed to demonstrate that the settlement reports were produced “in anticipation of litigation;” therefore, the reports are not attorney work product and CCA must produce the reports. Further, we affirm the award of attorney’s fees incurred at trial that pertained to requiring CCA to produce the settlement agreements. Finally, we find the petitioner is entitled to recover attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal to the extent they pertain to the settlement agreements, but not the settlement reports. On remand, the trial court shall make the appropriate award.