Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

This is a negligence case in which Passenger sued ETHRA and Driver for injuries she sustained when exiting an ETHRA public transit vehicle. The trial court dismissed the claim against Driver but denied ETHRA’s motion for summary judgment. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed the claim against ETHRA, holding that Passenger failed to prove that Driver was negligent. Passenger appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Ann C. King (“Wife”) filed a motion seeking to renew a 2001 judgment against David M. King (“Husband”). After a hearing, the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“Anderson Chancery Court”) entered an order renewing the judgment. Husband appeals to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Anderson Chancery Court lacked jurisdiction and whether the renewal of judgment complied with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 69.04. We hold that the Anderson Chancery Court had jurisdiction and did not err in renewing the judgment.

The Tennessee Supreme Court remanded this case to us for consideration in light of its opinion in Shipley v. Williams. In the original appeal of this medical malpractice case, this court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that the plaintiff’s only expert witness was not competent to testify pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115. On remand we conclude the trial court erred in ruling that the plaintiffs’ expert was not competent to testify and consequently, the plaintiffs created genuine issues of material fact, making summary judgment for defendants inappropriate. We reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.
 

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Donald R.S., Jr. (“Father”) to the minor children Dacia S., Aerial W. , and Teagan W. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children after finding and holding, inter alia, that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 102(1)(A)(iv) and that the termination was in the Children’s best interest. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of real property to which the appellees obtained title in May 2010. The appellant argued that the property belonged to her through the doctrine of adverse possession because she and her mother had used the property exclusively since 1937. The appellees proved at trial that the appellant had not paid taxes on the land for more than 22 years and moved for a directed verdict at the close of the appellant’s case-in chief. The trial court granted the motion based upon the statutory bar imposed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-110. The appellant appeals. We affirm.

Employer terminated employee shortly after discovering she was pregnant. Thereafter, employee filed a complaint against her former employer asserting claims of sex and pregnancy discrimination, retaliation, and misrepresentation. Following a period of discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on each of the employee’s claims. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

This case focuses, in the context of the parties’ divorce, on the distribution of their marital assets and debts. Gwendolyn Ann Cradic (“Wife”) filed a complaint for divorce against Kenneth Wayne Cradic (“Husband”) on October 24, 2008. The parties went to trial in October 2011 on the issues of fault and division of property. The court awarded Wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. It then divided the parties’ assets and debts. Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of one asset and its division of marital property. We affirm.

This interlocutory appeal involves the question of whether the arbitration provisions contained in Tenn. Code Ann. §56-7-1206(f)-(k)(2008), a part of the Tennessee uninsured motorist (“UM”) statutory scheme, apply to policies with UM coverage that were issued and delivered in Texas. The trial court held that the arbitration provisions do apply. The UM carriers, brought into this action pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. §56-7- 1206(a), appealed that decision. We reverse the trial court’s judgment.

This is a termination of parental rights case pertaining to two minor children (collectively “the Children”) of the defendant, Valtrella C. (“Mother”). The Children were placed in the custody of the petitioners, Jason C. and Edana B., in November 2009. The Children had been removed from Mother by the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) because of Mother’s substance abuse problems. Jason C. and Edana B. filed a petition in June 2011 seeking to terminate the parental rights of Mother. They alleged that grounds for termination existed due to abandonment based on Mother’s willful failure to visit or pay more than token support. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother had willfully failed to visit the Children. The court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the best interest of the Children. Mother appeals. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a dispute concerning a contract for employment. Roy W. Keith (“Keith”) sued Michael J. Jackson, Sr. and Nata M. Jackson (“the Jacksons”) in the Circuit Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”), alleging that he was not paid separation payments due to him under an employment agreement. The Jacksons answered the complaint, arguing essentially that Keith waived these payments when he accepted a job in the new corporation. Keith filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. The Jacksons appeal to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment as there remained a material controversy regarding whether Keith waived his right to payment under the employment agreement. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court.