Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for McMinn County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Jennifer K. (“Mother”) to the minor children Selena V. and Liliana V. (“the Children”), born in 2007 and 2008 respectively. After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of Mother to the Children after finding that the ground of persistent conditions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that clear and convincing evidence had been shown that it was in the Children’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm.

This appeal concerns the administration of an estate. Decedent died testate, leaving all of his non-marital property to his surviving spouse and appointing his daughter as executrix. Executrix and Beneficiary initially agreed that administration of the estate was unnecessary. After Beneficiary suffered an injury and was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s Disease, Executrix attempted to parcel out the property to Beneficiary’s intended heirs. Shortly thereafter, Beneficiary sought administration of the estate. The trial court admitted the estate and following lengthy hearings regarding which items belonged in the estate, directed Executrix to pay the expenses and close the estate. Beneficiary did not appeal. Over Beneficiary’s objection, Executrix organized an auction of the items held in the estate to satisfy the expenses. Following the auction, Beneficiary filed a petition in which she alleged that Executrix breached her fiduciary duty to the estate by organizing an auction that resulted in waste and mismanagement of estate funds. The trial court denied the petition. Beneficiary appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Sheila W. (“Mother”) to the minor children Dacia S., Aerial W., and Teagan W. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children after finding and holding, inter alia, that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) and § 36-1-113(g)(3) and that the termination was in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm.

Wife and Husband entered into a marital dissolution agreement whereby Husband agreed to pay Wife rehabilitative alimony for three years. Husband terminated these payments and filed a petition to modify when Wife remarried and her employment situation improved. Wife filed motion for summary judgment on the issue asserting that the alimony payments could not be modified or terminated. The trial court ruled the alimony payments could not be modified because they were contractual in nature and awarded Wife her attorney’s fees. Husband appealed both the court’s ruling as well as the award of fees. We reverse the trial court’s judgment that the rehabilitative alimony payments are unmodifiable because the applicable statute expressly provides that a court may modify this type of alimony upon a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances. We affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees based on the language of the parties’ agreement providing for the award of these fees.

This appeal involves injuries allegedly sustained by an employee as a result of her employment. The heirs of the deceased employee filed this lawsuit asserting numerous common law tort claims against the deceased employee’s employers. The employers filed separate motions to dismiss, arguing that the exclusive remedy for the alleged injuries was pursuant to the workers’ compensation law, and that the plaintiffs’ common law tort claims were barred. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

This case involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to three children who had been placed in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. The mother had made some progress in complying with the permanency plan developed by the Department, but was still experiencing “instability.” Nearly two years after the mother relinquished control of the children, the Department petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The trial court granted the petition, terminating the mother’s parental rights on the ground that the conditions that led to the children’s removal continued with little likelihood of remedy. The mother appeals. We affirm.

This case involves monetary damages for contempt of court. The respondent owned a parcel of land as tenants in common with his brother. When the brother died, the deceased brother’s children inherited his interest in the property. The deceased brother’s daughters filed this petition against the respondent to partition the property. The trial court entered an order equitably dividing the property between the respondent and the two petitioner sisters and requiring the respondent to remove personal property, junk, and debris he had placed on the parcel awarded to the sisters. The respondent was found in contempt for failing to remove the debris, and again ordered to do so. Apparently unhappy with this order, the respondent proceeded to remove, damage, or destroy fixtures and structures on the property awarded to the sisters, including a pole barn, several sheds, and a garage with an apartment. He also failed to remove the junk and debris as specified in the trial court’s order. The petitioner sisters filed a second petition for contempt and sought contempt damages for the harm done to the buildings, fixtures, and structures. The trial court found the respondent in contempt a second time, based on his continued failure to remove the junk and debris. However, the trial court declined to award contempt damages to the petitioner sisters under T.C.A. § 29-9105 for the destruction of the structural improvements on the property, finding that it was not within the parameters of the trial court’s initial order. The petitioner sisters appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case involves a post-trial dispute between one party to a personal injury case and their former counsel. After a jury verdict was entered in favor of Appellants, their former law firm filed an attorney lien and a motion to recover its attorney fees in the trial court. Appellants asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the former firm’s motion. The trial court disagreed and awarded the former firm its full requested fee. Appellants appeal both the award of attorney fees to its former law firm, and also the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ request to release funds held by the clerk. We conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the post-trial dispute and reverse the award of attorneys fees in this case. However, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to release funds. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to quash Appellee’s hospital liens, which were filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-22-101 et seq. In each Appellant’s case, the hospital filed a lien and then recovered adjusted amounts for services rendered pursuant to the hospital’s agreements with the Appellant’s respective insurance providers. Despite having received payment, the hospital argues that it may return these adjusted payments to the insurance provider and may, instead, seek to recover its full, unadjusted bill from the Appellants’ third-party tortfeasors by foreclosing its liens. We conclude that: (1) a lien, under the HLA, presupposes the existence of a debt; (2) Appellants are third-party beneficiaries of their respective insurer’s service contract with the Appellee hospital; (3) having chosen to accept a price certain for services as “payment in full” and having, in fact, accepted payment from Appellants’ insurance providers, the underlying debt is extinguished; (4) in the absence of an underlying debt, the hospital may not maintain its lien; (5) the right to subrogate belongs to the insurance provider and a hospital lien does not create a subrogation right in the hospital. Reversed and remanded.