Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

Mother and Father were divorced, and Mother was named the primary residential parent of their three children. Mother remarried and decided to relocate to California. Father opposed the relocation and sought to be named the primary residential parent. By the time of hearing, relocation of only one child was at issue. Father introduced expert testimony that the relocation would pose a threat of specific and serious harm to the child that outweighed the threat of harm to the child from a change of custody, as set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-6108(d)(1)(B). Relying on the expert’s testimony, the trial court denied Mother the opportunity to relocate with the child to California. Mother appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this divorce proceeding, Husband appeals the trial court’s determination that, pursuant to the unclean hands doctrine, he is not entitled to proceeds of property sold in a partition action. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.

In this case regarding title insurance company’s duty to seller of real property, the trial court found no factual dispute regarding the escrow agent’s apparent agency and granted summary judgment to title insurance company against seller of real property. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure of their claims for conspiracy, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from an alleged wrongful foreclosure.We affirm the trial court in all respects.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on three minor children (“the Children”). The defendants are Russell C. (“Father”) and Brandy C. (“Mother”). The Children were taken into custody by the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) in January 2008 because of repeated injuries sustained by the oldest child. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents in April 2010, alleging numerous grounds for termination. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father and Mother were in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans and that the conditions leading to removal still persisted. However, the trial court found that severe child abuse was not proven. The court did find, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Father and Mother appeal. We reverse in part and affirm in part. Termination of the parents’ parental rights is affirmed.

Husband appeals the trial court’s award of alimony and partial attorney’s fees to Wife in this divorce action. Finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we affirm.

A townhome owner and her tenant challenge an amendment adopted by the owner’s townhome association prohibiting the owner from leasing her unit to a third party. The owner purchased her unit before there were any restrictions on leasing individual units. The amendment was adopted in accordance with the Horizontal Property Act and in accordance with the documents governing the units where she lives. The trial court granted the association’s motion for summary judgment enjoining the owner from renting her townhome to a third party and requiring the tenant to vacate the unit. On appeal we conclude the amendment is enforceable and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a declaratory judgment action wherein one insurance company, which provided general liability insurance coverage to the insured, asserts that another insurance company, which provided the same insured with automobile insurance coverage, had the primary duty to pay the cost of defending and to indemnify the insured in a third-party tort action filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-112. The plaintiff insurer asserts that the defendant insurer had the primary duty to provide and pay the cost of the defense in that action and to indemnify the insured pursuant to its automobile insurance policy because an additional insured was operating a “boom truck” owned by the insured that was listed under the defendant’s auto policy when the injury to the third-party plaintiff occurred.Both insurers filed motions for summary judgment.The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion and granted summary judgment to the defendant insurer holding that the plaintiff, not the defendant, is liable for providing and paying the cost of the defense and for indemnifying the insured in the third-party tort action. We affirm.

A bank filed a complaint against husband and wife to recoup money owed on a credit agreement after a foreclosure sale failed to produce sufficient funds to repay the loan in full. The trial court entered a judgment against the couple, and the couple appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment because the bank relied on two different versions of a credit agreement, thereby failing to prove the existence of an enforceable contract with definite terms.

This case involves the issue of retroactive child support and whether the trial court appropriately denied Wife’s request. Husband’s divorce petition was pending for more than three years before Wife answered. During that time the parties were separated, and Husband made monthly car payments on Wife’s vehicle in an amount that exceeded what would have been his child support obligation. We conclude that Husband satisfied his child support obligations based on the unique facts of this case and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal arises from a divorce. Harold Dean McDaniel (“Husband”) sued Kimberly Ruth McDaniel (“Wife”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). After a long and contentious legal battle, including an earlier appeal to this Court and subsequent remand for a new trial, the Trial Court entered its supplemental final decree of divorce. Wife appeals, raising a number of issues. We hold that the Trial Court did not adequately compute child support, and, therefore remand for its proper computation. We also modify the allocation of guardian ad litem fees. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified, in part, and vacated, in part.