Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

This is a breach of contract case involving the enforcement of an arbitration clause. We find the arbitration clause applicable, reverse the judgment of the lower court, and remand the case for
arbitration.

This is a post-divorce child custody suit. Joseph Weibel III (“father”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court of Shelby County against Jacqueline Brewer (“mother”) seeking to have custody of the parties’ minor child, Joseph Weibel IV, (“Joey”) changed from mother to father. Mother had primary  physical custody of the parties’ child pursuant to a consent order calling for joint custody. Following a hearing, the chancellor awarded father sole custody, with mother having extensive visitation. The court also ordered father to pay mother’s attorney fees and expenses in connection with the litigation. Mother has raised two issues by this appeal. First, whether the evidence preponderates against the finding of the chancellor that it was in the best interest of the parties’ child to award custody to father. And  second, although father was directed to pay mother’s attorney fees and litigation expenses in connection with the trial below, mother as appellant herein raises the issue of whether the chancellor abused his discretion in directing father to pay mother’s attorney fees. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm the award of custody to father and reverse the award of  attorney fees to mother.

This is a premises liability case under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant governmental entity. We affirm.

I concur with the Court’s decision on the ground that the summaries of Harold L. Jenkins’s financial records indicate a lack of trustworthiness because of their method of compilation and their incompleteness.

Plaintiff Patty M. Richards appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants/Appellees O’Connor Management, Inc., and Russ Hackett.In entering summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, the trial court dismissed Richards’ claims for outrageous conduct and false imprisonment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The defendants, Robert and Deborah Koch, have appealed from a non jury judgment that plaintiffs, Joseph and Gloria Gannon, have a private easement from their land across the land of
defendants for access to the public way.

In this divorce case, the defendant-counter claimant husband has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court dismissing the husband’s counterclaim; granting the wife a divorce on grounds of inappropriate marital conduct, $750 per month alimony until her death or remarriage, and $10,000.00 attorneys fees; and dividing the marital estate.

Defendant Harriet C. Upton, now known as Harriet Cathey, appeals the trial court’s final judgment awarding Plaintiff/Appellee James B. Oliver the sum of $15,225.66, continuing in effect the lis pendens filed against the subject property pending Cathey’s satisfaction of the judgment, denying Cathey’s request for attorney’s fees, and assessing forty percent (40%) of the costs against Cathey. We affirm the judgment in part (with modifications), reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

This somewhat protracted litigation began in August 1993 when Brian Keith Feather (Husband) filed for divorce from Dolly deKrafft Feather (Wife). A divorce decree was entered by the chancery court in September 1994, which, inter alia, dissolved the fifteen year marriage of the parties and determined custody of their four minor children. Separate orders pertaining to the case were entered by the trial court in August and October, 1995, respectively. Both parties appealed therefrom, but this Court in April 1996, determined that the parties’ respective appeals were from a nonfinal judgment. Litigation thereafter continued due to the parties’ filings of various petitions for contempt, to rehear and to modify custody. After additional hearings, the trial court entered its final judgment in December 1996 from which both parties have appealed.1 The primary issues before us concern the trial court’s decisions regarding child custody and classification and division of the marital estate. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm as modified.

I agree with the majority’s analysis in this case. However, I concur separately to emphasize
that our review, under either the common law writ of certiorari or the statutory writ, should be
limited to hearing the petitioner’s claims regarding “the illegality of acts taken by the disciplinary
board.” Williams v. Tennessee Dept. of Correction, No. 02A01-9503-CV-00046 1995 WL 575142
(Tenn. App. Oct. 2 1995). Even if the requirements of a statutory writ of certiorari are met, our
review should not include the substance of the disciplinary proceeding, i.e. whether the petitioner
actually committed the acts with which he was charged.