Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

This is an appeal from the trial court's judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiffs' fraud and contract allegations. Appellants are William Max Nichols, maker of certain notes representing student loans, and his father, Maxie L. Nichols, who was co-maker on said notes. The Appellee is Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation (TSAC), a non-profit corporation created by the General Assembly to guarantee and administer loans made by educational institution lenders to students attending post-secondary schools in Tennessee. T.C.A. § 49-4-203(1)- (3) (1990).

This appeal involves a suit brought by an employee against his employer asserting that the employer's actions, in connection with the employee's demotion and subsequent termination, violated The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA), T.C.A. § 4-21-101 (1991), et. seq. The employee also alleges that the employer's actions in connection with the demotion and termination were slanderous and constituted outrageous conduct. Plaintiff employee, Charles K. Newsom, appeals from the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to defendant, Textron Aerostructures, Inc., and Gary Smith,1 and the only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in so doing. The pertinent facts are as follows.

This appeal involves a suit primarily based onthe Public Employee Political Freedom Act of 1980, T.C.A. §§ 8-50-601 - 8-50-604 (1993) (hereinafter PEPFA). Plaintiff, Judy Pewitt, appeals from the circuit court's summary judgment order dismissing Pewitt's PEPFA and retaliatory discharge claims against defendants, Lillie Buford, Cliff Frensley, and Williamson County

This appeal represents a consolidation of three actions. The first case, styled V.R. Williams & Company v. Paul M. Quandt and Nelle Quandt, is an appeal to Circuit Court from a judgment in the General Sessions Court of Franklin County finding Paul Quandt indebted to V.R. Williams & Co. in the amount of $3664.69 for past due insurance premiums. The second case, styled In Re: Estate of Paul Max Quandt, Deceased, is a probate proceeding filed in the Chancery Court of Franklin County to administer the estate of Paul Max Quandt. The only issues in the probate proceeding heard on consolidation concern creditors' claims filed against Paul Quandt's estate and the exceptions filed thereto. The third case, styled Mid-South Bank & Company, V.R. Williams & Company and Franklin County Bank v. Paul Max Quandt Estate, Nelle S. Quandt, Jessica Quandt, Paul Quandt, Jr. and Paul Max Quandt, III., is a Chancery Court action to set aside fraudulent conveyances of property owned by Paul M. Quandt Defendants/Appellants

I concur with the result of the majority's opinion but add this separate opinion to state my understanding of the source and nature of the duty of prison officials to persons who are placed involuntarily in their custody.

The claimant, Billy R. Parks, has appealed from a summary judgment of the Probate Court dismissing his claim against the captioned estate. Appellant presents the issues in the following form: 1. The Chancellor erred in ruling that Mr. Parks had no legal basis for making a claim on the theories of implied or quasi contract, or a theory of unjust enrichment of Mr. Jenkins. 2. The Chancellor erred in ruling that Mr. Parks could not recover under an implied or quasi contract theory because of the existence of an express contract between the parties.

In 1987 the United States Supreme Court placed limits on the use of private lawyers to prosecute criminal contempt cases in federal court. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987). This appeal calls upon us to decide whether similar limitations should be placed on the use of private lawyers to prosecute criminal contempt cases in state court. The majority has declined to adopt the reasoning of the Young decision based on an
unduly narrow view of this court's responsibility. I cannot join the majority’s opinion. Instead, I would find that the resolution of this important question must await another day because the appellant has waived his right to raise the issue by failing to make a timely demand for another prosecutor in the trial court.