Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

Defendant, James Strong Powell, an attorney, was indicted for aggravated perjury. Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury and sentenced by the trial court to serve two years, seven months, and nine days in confinement as a Range I standard offender. Defendant now appeals his conviction and sentence. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by: 1) allowing the trial judge, who presided over the hearing at which Defendant was alleged to have perjured himself, to testify at trial beyond the scope of the trial judge’s expertise; and 2) denying Defendant’s request for a sentence of full probation. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Petitioner, Clifford Eric Burgess, of five counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective twenty-five-year sentence in the Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed his convictions, and this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. See State v. Clifford Eric Burgess, M2008-01370-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2433059 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Aug. 10, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 20, 2009). The Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he claimed that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s failure to have him evaluated for mental illness. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

On January 19, 2011, appellant, Benji L. Creech, pled guilty to selling oxycodone, a schedule II drug, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417. Appellant received a sentence of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, which was suspended to probation. On February 8, 2012, his probation was revoked. In lieu of serving his three-year sentence in the Department of Correction, appellant entered the drug court program. On June 14, 2012, appellant was summarily dismissed from the drug court program upon the allegation that he falsified a sponsor contact sheet. After a hearing on July 25, 2012, appellant’s probation was revoked again. On appeal, he argues that the evidence does not support the trial court’s decision to revoke his probation and serve his sentence in confinement. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Danielle White, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2006) (amended 2009, 2010, 2011). She received sentences for each conviction of three years and six months, with four months to be served in jail. The sentences are to be served concurrently. On appeal, she contends that (1) the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel and in allowing her to represent herself; (2) the trial judge erred in failing to recuse himself, and denying her a fair trial; (3) the grand jury foreman was not selected constitutionally because there was a systematic exclusion based upon gender, race, and ethnicity; (4) the indictment was invalid because no grand jury foreman was appointed; (5) the trial court erred in using a jury selection process that was not in accord with the relevant statute; (6) the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress; and (7) there was prosecutorial misconduct when the assistant district attorney referred to the Defendant’s invoking her right to counsel. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Christopher Evonne Rodriguez, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from an aggravated burglary conviction. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing "to raise any defense . . . of a crime spree." Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Edy Chavez Pantaleon, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. In addition, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight and that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. Upon our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Arthur T. Rogers ("the Defendant") was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to two concurrent terms of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this delayed direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Kalvin Hardaway, of reckless aggravated assault and initiating a false report, Class D felonies. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, career offender to twelve years for each conviction to be served concurrently. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to question the victim about the victim’s drug use. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Vincent Lanier, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner was indicted for rape but entered a guilty plea to statutory rape. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his judgment is void because (1) he entered a guilty plea to statutory rape, which is not a lesser included offense of the charged offense of rape, and his indictment was never amended from rape to statutory rape, and (2) trial counsel and the trial court failed to advise him that he would have to comply with the registration requirements of Tennessee’s sexual offender registration act because of his guilty plea to statutory rape. See T.C.A. § 39-13-506(d)(2)(B) (stating that “[i]n addition to the punishment provided for a person who commits statutory rape for the first time, the trial judge may order, after taking into account the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense, including the offense for which the person was originally charged and whether the conviction was the result of a plea bargain agreement, that the person be required to register as a sexual offender pursuant to title 40, chapter 39, part 2”). Upon review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority opinion in this case concluding that the trial court properly admitted the murder of Carlos Perez (the Florida murder) pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. In my view, the State failed to show that the method used in these murders was so unique as to constitute a signature that would give rise to the inference of identity. Based on the following authority and analysis, I would have concluded that the admission of the Florida murder was unfairly prejudicial and reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial.

Appellant, Henry Lee Jones, appeals from his convictions of two counts of premeditated first degree murder and two counts of felony murder and his sentences of death resulting from the August 2003 deaths of Clarence and Lillian James. At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury unanimously found the presence of four statutory aggravating circumstances relating to the murder of Mrs. James: (1) Appellant was previously convicted of two or more felonies involving the use of violence; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of Appellant or another; and (4) the murder was knowingly committed while Appellant had a substantial role in committing any robbery. See T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (5), (6), (7). The jury unanimously found the presence of the same four statutory aggravating circumstances with regard to the murder of Mr. James, as well as an additional statutory aggravating circumstance, that the victim was 70 years of age or older. See id. at (i)(14). The jury determined that these aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances and imposed sentences of death. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a subsequent murder; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the victims; and (4) whether Tennessee’s sentencing statute for first degree murder is unconstitutional. After a review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm Appellant’s convictions and sentences of death and remand this matter to the trial court for entry of a single judgment of conviction for first degree murder with regard to each victim.

The petitioner, Tommie L. Hill, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.