Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

Appellant, Larry Lee Robertson, pled guilty to selling oxycodone in Sumner County in October of 2010. He received a sentence of six years on probation. In May of 2012, a probation violation warrant was filed alleging that Appellant violated the terms of his probation by using intoxicants to excess and pleading guilty to a public intoxication charge. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. After a review of the record and authorities, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s probation as there was evidence to support the conclusion of the trial court that a violation of the conditions of probation occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, John Doe, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to challenge his guilty-pleaded, 1995 attempted aggravated sexual battery conviction arising in that same court. Specifically, the petitioner, whose three-year sentence was suspended, challenged his conviction based upon sanctions imposed upon him by 2004 and 2007 changes to the sexual offender registration law. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. We affirm the order of the habeas corpus court.

On October 5, 2005, a Davidson County jury convicted petitioner of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and theft over $500 but less than $1,000. The trial court sentenced him to an effective term of seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This court affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal. State v. Robert Lamont Moss, Jr., No. M2006-00890-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 4245082, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 4, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. April 7, 2008). Subsequently, petitioner filed petitions for post-conviction relief and writ of error coram nobis. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the post-conviction petition on the merits and the coram nobis petition as time-barred. On appeal, petitioner argues that (1) trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance; (2) his right to due process was denied by the trial court’s denial of funds for the defense to hire experts in eyewitness reliability and shoe print identification; and (3) he is entitled to a writ of error coram nobis. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Jonathan Kyle Hulse, w as found guilty by a Washington County Criminal Court jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; and unauthorized use of a vehicle, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13- 502 (2010) (aggravated rape), 39-13-305 (2010) (especially aggravated kidnapping), 39-14-106 (2010) (unauthorized use of a vehicle). He was sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-nine years for each of the Class A felonies and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor. The trial court ordered that the felony convictions be served consecutively, for an effective fifty-eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, (2) his dual convictions for aggravated rape and especially aggravated kidnapping violate due process principles, and (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the deceased victim’s statements about the crimes as excited utterances. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Petitioner, Billy Ray Irick, filed a motion to reopen his error coram nobis proceedings or, in the alternative, a second petition for writ of error coram nobis. In his pleading, he reasserted the grounds underlying his first petition for the writ and added claims of judicial misconduct pertaining to the judge in his first coram nobis proceedings. The coram nobis court in the instant case denied relief, and this appeal follows. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Defendant, Christopher Burress, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his two convictions for facilitation of aggravated robbery and ordering him to serve his effective six-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search of his person, (2) finding that he violated his probation by resisting arrest, (3) revoking his probation, and (4) ordering him to serve the sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kristin M. Myers, was convicted by a Loudon County jury of first degree premeditated murder and received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her statements made to authorities because she did not execute a knowing, voluntary wavier of her Miranda rights. The Defendant also contends that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support her conviction. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress her statements and that the evidence produced at trial is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Gary K. Thomas, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his January 2005 conviction for simple assault. The Petitioner’s August 2012 petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his plea was not voluntary, was dismissed as untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file an appeal after he requested such action. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Daniel Humphrey ("the Defendant") pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary and, pursuant to his plea agreement, was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three years on community corrections. Upon the subsequent filing of a violation warrant, the Defendant was taken into custody, and the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections sentence and ordered him to serve the remainder of his original sentence in confinement. The Defendant appealed the trial court’s ruling. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant was found guilty after a trial by jury of aggravated arson, a Class A felony, aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, theft of property over $1000.00, a Class D felony. He was sentenced to twenty years for aggravated arson, six years for aggravated burglary, and four years for theft over $1,000.00, with all sentences to run concurrently, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that one of the State’s witnesses was an accomplice as a matter of law. Upon review, we determine that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions and that the trial court properly instructed the jury with respect to the legal status of the State’s witness. The judgments from the trial court are affirmed.

This case has been remanded by the Tennessee Supreme Court for reconsideration of sentencing in light of State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273 (Tenn. 2012). On direct appeal, this court concluded that the Defendant waived review of his sentence by failing to include a transcript of the guilty plea hearing. In light of Caudle, we conclude that the record, which contains transcripts of the motion to suppress hearing and the sentencing hearing, exhibits from each hearing, and the presentence report, is sufficient to determine whether the trial court recited a proper basis for the sentence. 388 S.W.3d 273. The Defendant, Brett Joseph Price, pleaded guilty to robbery, a Class C felony, and conspiracy to commit robbery, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-401, 39-12-103 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years for robbery and to three years for conspiracy, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress his post-arrest statements and by admitting his statement at the sentencing hearing; (2) denying judicial diversion; (3) imposing excessive sentences; and (4) denying probation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.