Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

Roy L. McAlister ("the Defendant") pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated statutory rape and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of three years, to be suspended to supervised probation after service of 219 days in confinement. Upon the filing of a probation violation warrant, the Defendant was taken into custody, and a probation violation hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appealed the trial court’s ruling. Based upon the record before us, we are compelled to vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand this action to the Robertson County Circuit Court for further findings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Rocky Joe Houston, was convicted on April 1, 2010, of reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, and evading arrest, a Class E felony, for which he was sentenced, respectively, to eleven months, twenty-nine days and one year, as a standard offender. In his notice of appeal, he asserted that the trial court erred in denying the judgment of acquittal and asked that this court order the lawyer in his 2008 trial to return the sum of $65,000, which was a portion of the amount the defendant asserts he paid to the lawyer. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Terrance Holliday, was found guilty of first degree (premeditated) murder of the victim, Michael Woods, and sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. The defendant also claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a photographic identification and by denying his motion in limine with respect to certain statements made by a deceased co-defendant, which were introduced into evidence though another witness. After careful review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction and that the trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motions. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted petitioner, Marlos Shields, of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced him to an effective eighteen-year sentence. Following his direct appeal, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, and petitioner now appeals. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Larry Payne, was convicted by a jury of four counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies, against two victims. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals merged the four convictions into two, one for each victim, and otherwise affirmed the judgments. The Tennessee Supreme Court declined discretionary review. The petitioner then brought this timely post-conviction petition, asserting various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner’s sole issue on appeal is whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of theft. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any prejudice resulting from his counsel’s failure to request a jury charge on the lesser included offense of theft. The petitioner’s failure to establish prejudice is fatal to his ineffective assistance claim. The judgment of the court below is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted of selling more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony, and selling more than 0.5 grams of cocaine within a school zone, a Class A felony. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of the latter charge. The defendant also claims that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury with respect to lesser included offenses and by permitting the State to ask questions concerning prior drug transactions between the defendant and a confidential informant. After review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions and that his remaining claims have been waived. We affirm the judgments of the trial court accordingly.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Mahlon Johnson, of one count of aggravated assault and two counts of sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for sexual battery; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to merge the sexual battery convictions; (3) the Defendant’s convictions for sexual battery and aggravated assault violate double jeopardy protections; and (4) the trial court improperly sentenced him. The State agrees that there is insufficient evidence to support the Defendant’s sexual battery convictions, and it asks us to reverse those convictions and dismiss the indictments. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists in the record sufficient evidence to support the Defendant’s convictions and that the trial court did not err when it did not merge those convictions. We further conclude that the trial court did not err when it sentenced the Defendant. We, therefore, affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentence.

On December 12, 2011, the petitioner, Gary S. Mayes, filed a pro se petition for a writ of error coram nobis alleging newly discovered evidence related to the Knox County Criminal Court’s 2008 denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The coram nobis court summarily denied relief. We affirm the denial of relief.

The Dickson County Circuit Court denied the Petitioner, Jerry Ray Davidson, post-conviction relief from his convictions of first degree premeditated murder and aggravated kidnapping and his sentence of death. The Petitioner appeals. Having discerned no error, we affirm the post conviction court’s denial of relief.

The Knox County Criminal Court denied Defendant Darrick Eugene McAllister’s motion to suppress all evidence seized in a warrantless search. Subsequently, Defendant entered a guilty plea, and according to the amended judgment in the record, Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to sell less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and received a sentence of eight (8) years as a Range II multiple offender. The amended judgment and the negotiated plea agreement documents show that Defendant reserved a certified question of law for appeal. The transcript of the guilty plea hearing is not in the record. After a review of the record, we affirm the amended judgment of the trial court. We note, however, that the negotiated plea agreement documents reflect that Defendant was going to plead guilty to the Class C felony offense of attempted possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a drug free zone (a park). However, we did not have jurisdiction in this case to do anything but affirm the amended judgment (which we do) or reverse the amended judgment and dismiss the charges. The trial court, however, may review the entire record and take appropriate measures, if any, to correct the amended judgment.

The defendant, James Ryan Stephenson, was convicted by a Rhea County jury of reckless homicide, a Class D felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his sentence in a burglary case for which he was on probation at the time of the homicide. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by: (1) granting the State’s request to remove a juror on the second day of trial; (2) allowing the State to impeach his credibility with his prior convictions for theft and burglary; (3) issuing a jury instruction on the impeachment of a witness after the testimony of a defense witness but not after the testimony of a State witness; and (4) failing to apply any mitigating factors in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.