Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

Appellant, Ronald McKnight, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated burglary. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged and sentenced to fifteen years as a career offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

Petitioner, Duane M. Coleman, was convicted by a Davidson County Jury of second degree murder. He was sentenced to thirty-two years as a Range II, multiple offender. State v. Duane Coleman, No. M1998-00663-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 31858, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jan. 18, 2000). He unsuccessfully appealed his conviction. Id. at *14. Petitioner also unsuccessfully filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Duane Coleman v. State, No. M2008-02180-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2890676, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jul. 23, 2010). Petitioner subsequently filed a "Motion for Relief From Judgement" based upon Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, on March 5, 2012. In this motion, Petitioner argued that his constitutional rights were violated by the imposition of enhancement factors and the imposition of 100% release eligibility without being found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. His argument was based upon the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The habeas corpus court determined that the motion under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure was uncognizable and treated the motion as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court then summarily dismissed the petition. We have reviewed the record on appeal. We agree with the habeas corpus court’s determination that the motion should be treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Additionally, we conclude that prior case law has determined that a Blakely violation does not apply retroactively and renders a judgment voidable instead of void. See Timothy R. Bowles v. State, No. M2006-01685-CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 1266594, at *2-3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 1, 2007) Therefore, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

In June 2003, John E. Allen, Jr. ("the Petitioner") pleaded nolo contendere to one count of criminal attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery and received a six-year sentence. More than eight years later, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The State sought dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the Petitioner’s claim for relief, and this appeal followed. The Petitioner’s sole argument on appeal is that our supreme court’s decision in Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2010), should be applied retroactively. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Christopher Scott Mayberry, was indicted by the Humphreys County Grand Jury in June of 2010 for two counts of possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell and one count of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine. After a bench trial, Appellant was found guilty of two counts of the sale of methamphetamine. The trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to the sale of cocaine. After a sentencing hearing, Appellant was sentenced to ten years for each conviction, to be served concurrently. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. After a review of the record and authorities, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions for the sale of methamphetamine. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Joseph R. Bledsoe, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s order declaring him a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender, claiming that the convictions used to support the designation were not valid. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Robert L. Conley, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 2006 convictions for sale of less than one-half gram of cocaine, possession with the intent to sell or deliver one-half gram of cocaine, and possession with the intent to use drug paraphernalia and his effective fourteen-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by finding that his petition was barred by the statute of limitations and by dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Donald Ragland, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that the post-conviction court erred by not forcing the Petitioner to testify at the post-conviction hearing; and (2) that the Petitioner received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel because trial counsel withdrew a motion to suppress a photographic identification of the Petitioner. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Zacheriah Holden, was indicted by the Warren County Grand Jury for over thirty offenses as a result of a drunk driving accident in which two people were killed. He pled guilty to several offenses before trial and was found guilty of the remaining charges. After the proper merger of offenses, Appellant’s convictions were two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, one count of reckless endangerment, driving on a revoked license, evading arrest, resisting arrest, leaving the scene of the accident, five counts of failure to render aid, failure to obey a traffic device and violation of the financial responsibility law. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of thirty years and eight months. Appellant appeals his convictions and his sentences. Appellant raises several issues on appeal. He argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his request for change of venue; (2) the trial court erred in denying his request for sequestration of the jury; (3) the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s various motions to suppress his statements to law enforcement and his seizure in a car; (4)the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude the testimony of the State’s accident reconstructionist as an expert witness; (5) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present a photograph of the victims’ car; (6) the trial court erred in failing to sever DUI, fourth offense from aggravated vehicular homicide; (7) the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Travis Battles who was going to testify to updates to the traffic light since the accident; (8) the State did not sufficiently prove the chain of custody of Appellant’s blood sample submitted for blood alcohol testing; (9) the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions; (10) the sentencing scheme for aggravated vehicular homicide is unconstitutional; (11) the trial court erred in imposing the length of his sentences, as well as imposing consecutive sentences; and (12) the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings on various pieces of evidence. We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the issues raised do not warrant reversal of the judgments below. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Craig L. Beene, appeals Dickson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the failure of Petitioner to file a complete copy of the petition for habeas corpus relief or the judgments from which he is appealing violate the requirements for seeking habeas corpus relief. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.