Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

The defendant, Michael Marks, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to twenty-five years at 100% as a child rapist. He raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by not requiring the State to make an election of offenses at the close of its casein-chief; (2) whether the trial court erred by not requiring the State to make an election before the case was submitted to the jury; (3) whether the trial court erred by issuing a supplemental instruction on the election of offenses after the jury had already begun its deliberations; and (4) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, John Davis, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of a single count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and received a twelve-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that his sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Charles T. Hartley, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Wayne County Circuit Court, alleging that his sentence for attempted aggravated sexual battery was illegal because the judgment of conviction reflected that, as a child predator and a violent offender, he must serve one hundred percent of the sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it concludes that aggravated assault involves some form of confinement in this case. In State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 578 (Tenn. 2012), the supreme court held, 

The Defendant, Glenn Lydell McCray, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-305 (2010) (especially aggravated kidnapping), 39-13-102 (2010) (aggravated assault), 39-17-1307 (2010) (felon in possession of a firearm). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty years for especially aggravated kidnapping, eight years for each aggravated assault, and three years for illegal possession of a firearm. The trial court ordered consecutive sentences for the especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault convictions, for an effective forty-six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, (2) the court improperly instructed the jury regarding the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, (3) the court erred by failing to merge the aggravated assault convictions, and (4) the court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. Although the jury was not properly instructed regarding the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s ruling suppressing the out-of-court identification of the defendant via a photograph array and the subsequent in-court identification by the same witness at the suppression hearing. The State contends that the trial court erred by deeming the identification procedure unduly suggestive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Troy Allen Pruitt, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 2007 convictions in that court of aggravated robbery and fraudulent use of a credit card. Because the petitioner failed to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and because binding law-of-the-case determinations from his direct appeal defeat his claim of prejudice, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Nora Hernandez, appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s order revoking her probation and denying her bid to vacate her convictions and sentences. Because this court lacks jurisdiction of the claim relevant to the defendant’s motion to vacate, that portion of the appeal is dismissed. Because the record supports revocation of her probation, the judgment of the trial court ordering the same is affirmed.

The petitioner, Bruce L. Robinson, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred, arguing that the United States Supreme Court’s recent holding in Missouri v. Frye , __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), established a new constitutional right that did not exist at the time of his guilty pleas, thereby requiring retroactive application. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing the petition as time-barred.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Michael McVay, with rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, rape, and sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve 25 years for rape of a child, 20 years for aggravated sexual battery, 20 years for rape, and 10 years for sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court ordered all sentences to run consecutively, with a 100% release eligibility for the first three counts - child rape, aggravated sexual battery, and rape, and a 35% release eligibility for count four, sexual battery by an authority figure, for an effective sentence of 75 years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant presents the following issues: (1) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s sexual behavior; (2) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s prior complaint of sexual assault; and (3) the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence. Additionally, the State contends the trial court improperly sentenced Defendant on two of his four convictions. After thorough review, we affirm Defendant’s convictions. However, the trial court’s sentencing order is vacated in part and this case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

The defendant, Kelvin Winn, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the identification of him from a photographic array; (2) the trial court erred in allowing a jailhouse informant to testify without limitations; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to lead witnesses over his objection; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of duplicative photographs; and (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.