Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

Appellant, Telly Romeras Robertson, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in October of 2008 for one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, one count of possession of more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, and one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. In January of 2009, Appellant was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of possession of ecstacy with the intent to sell or deliver, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to prepare a controlled substance, one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and casual exchange of marijuana. Appellant pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to sell ecstacy and possession with intent to deliver between .5 ounce and ten pounds of marijuana in exchange for sentences of ten years and two years, respectively. The sentences were to run consecutively to each other and to an eight-year sentence Appellant was already serving for conspiracy to commit money laundering, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied an alternative sentence. Appellant appeals. After a review of the record and authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an alternative sentence where: (1) Appellant was sentenced to a Class B felony, rendering him ineligible for probation; (2) probation was denied in order to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense; and (3) Appellant was incarcerated at the time of sentencing, rendering him ineligible for a sentence of Community Corrections. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Oscar Torres, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving an effective twenty-year sentence in the Department of Correction following his conviction for two counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for relief because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to object during jury-out hearings to recalling the victim as a rebuttal witness; and (2) failing to call an expert witness pertaining to the faultiness of the memory of a child witness. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Michael Ray McKee, contends that his right to a speedy trial regarding his probation revocation hearing was violated and, as a result, the trial court erred in revoking his probation. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated and that there was sufficient evidence presented to support the trial court’s revocation; we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Christopher Bomar Wenzler, was indicted by the Fayette County Grand Jury for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) in Count 1, and for DUI, third offense, in Count 2. Defendant pled guilty to DUI as charged in Count 1, and waived a jury trial and submitted to a bench trial as to the issues in Count 2. Count 2 alleged two prior DUI convictions: (i) in the Justice Court of DeSoto County, Mississippi on June 7, 2006, and (ii) in the General Sessions Court of Shelby County on February 9, 2006. Defendant argued in the trial court that the Mississippi conviction could not be lawfully used to enhance his current offense to DUI, third offense, but the trial court found Defendant guilty as charged. The trial court merged the conviction in Count 1 with the conviction in Count 2, and sentenced Defendant to serve 11 months and 29 days, with all but 120 days suspended as a third offense DUI offender. Defendant appeals, arguing that he should have been sentenced for DUI, second offense, because the judgment form used to prove Defendant’s prior conviction in DeSoto County, Mississippi is silent as to whether he was represented by counsel or waived his right to counsel. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant was convicted of possession of hydrocodone with intent to sell, a felony, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony, and possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. He received a total effective sentence of eight years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, and numerous evidentiary rulings. The defendant also claims that the trial court erred by failing to find mitigating factors and by sentencing him for a Class C felony with respect to his conviction for possession of hydrocodone with intent to sell or distribute, when the crime at issue was in fact a Class D felony. After review, we conclude that the trial court committed no reversible error with respect to the defendant’s convictions. However, the trial court erroneously sentenced the defendant with respect to at least one of his offenses. Consequently, we remand the case to the trial court for re-sentencing.

The appellant, Fredrick John Deen Clark, pled guilty in the Grundy County Circuit Court to vehicular assault, a Class D felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant received a six-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the appellant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Cody Garris, appeals from his Giles County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded conviction of child abuse, claiming that the trial court erred by imposing a fully-incarcerative sentence. Because the record supports the sentence imposed by the trial court, we affirm.

Defendant-Appellant, Victor Trezevant, appeals as of right his conviction for first degree murder committed during the perpetration of an attempted aggravated robbery, for which he received a life sentence. In this appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction of felony murder. Specifically, Trezevant contends that the State failed to corroborate the testimony of his accomplices. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Edgar Bailey, Jr., appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief because of alleged defects in the felony murder count of his indictment and because the trial court dismissed the felony murder count after remand by this court on direct appeal. We conclude that there is no error in the judgment of the habeas corpus court and affirm.

The appellant, Alexander Fuller, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s revoking his probation for theft of property valued one thousand dollars or more but less than ten thousand dollars and ordering that he serve his eight-year sentence in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal as of right by Defendant, Robert Edward Boling, from his conviction in the Sullivan County Criminal Court for aggravated robbery. In his first appeal as of right, this Court addressed only the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, affirmed the conviction on that issue, and refused to address all other issues because they were waived by Defendant’s attorney’s failure to timely file a motion for new trial. See State v. Robert Edward Boling, No. E2008-00351-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 482763 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2009) no perm. app. filed. Subsequently, Defendant timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court granted Defendant a delayed appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-113(a)(1)(“When the trial judge conducting a hearing pursuant to [the Post-conviction Procedure Act] finds that the petitioner was denied the right to an appeal from the original conviction in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Tennessee . . . the judge can . . . grant a delayed appeal;”). In accordance with our supreme court’s opinion in Wallace v. State, 121 S.W.3d 652 (Tenn. 2003), the untimely motion for new trial being a nullity, Defendant was granted the ability to file a timely motion for new trial. He did, and it was overruled. Defendant now appeals his conviction for the second time and appropriately raises two issues for our review in this appeal: (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion for new counsel; and (2) the trial court erred by denying his objection to certain photographs and testimony, which Defendant asserts were “fruit of the poisonous tree” of his coerced confession. Defendant’s third issue, the post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial, is premature. After a review of Defendant’s two properly presented issues, we again affirm the judgment of conviction.