Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

Arthur T. Rogers ("the Defendant") was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to two concurrent terms of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this delayed direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Kalvin Hardaway, of reckless aggravated assault and initiating a false report, Class D felonies. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, career offender to twelve years for each conviction to be served concurrently. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to question the victim about the victim’s drug use. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Vincent Lanier, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner was indicted for rape but entered a guilty plea to statutory rape. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his judgment is void because (1) he entered a guilty plea to statutory rape, which is not a lesser included offense of the charged offense of rape, and his indictment was never amended from rape to statutory rape, and (2) trial counsel and the trial court failed to advise him that he would have to comply with the registration requirements of Tennessee’s sexual offender registration act because of his guilty plea to statutory rape. See T.C.A. § 39-13-506(d)(2)(B) (stating that “[i]n addition to the punishment provided for a person who commits statutory rape for the first time, the trial judge may order, after taking into account the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense, including the offense for which the person was originally charged and whether the conviction was the result of a plea bargain agreement, that the person be required to register as a sexual offender pursuant to title 40, chapter 39, part 2”). Upon review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority opinion in this case concluding that the trial court properly admitted the murder of Carlos Perez (the Florida murder) pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. In my view, the State failed to show that the method used in these murders was so unique as to constitute a signature that would give rise to the inference of identity. Based on the following authority and analysis, I would have concluded that the admission of the Florida murder was unfairly prejudicial and reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial.

Appellant, Henry Lee Jones, appeals from his convictions of two counts of premeditated first degree murder and two counts of felony murder and his sentences of death resulting from the August 2003 deaths of Clarence and Lillian James. At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury unanimously found the presence of four statutory aggravating circumstances relating to the murder of Mrs. James: (1) Appellant was previously convicted of two or more felonies involving the use of violence; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of Appellant or another; and (4) the murder was knowingly committed while Appellant had a substantial role in committing any robbery. See T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (5), (6), (7). The jury unanimously found the presence of the same four statutory aggravating circumstances with regard to the murder of Mr. James, as well as an additional statutory aggravating circumstance, that the victim was 70 years of age or older. See id. at (i)(14). The jury determined that these aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances and imposed sentences of death. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a subsequent murder; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the victims; and (4) whether Tennessee’s sentencing statute for first degree murder is unconstitutional. After a review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm Appellant’s convictions and sentences of death and remand this matter to the trial court for entry of a single judgment of conviction for first degree murder with regard to each victim.

The petitioner, Tommie L. Hill, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

The petitioner, Justin Diana, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to one count of attempted solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means and three counts of statutory rape. He received a total effective sentence of four years. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel were ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Michael T. Braxton, appeals the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Wade Allen Willis, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury for the offenses of driving under the influence of intoxicants per se (DUI), violation of the registration law, violation of the financial responsibility law, and for failure to maintain control of his vehicle. The charges were the result of a traffic stop of Defendant by a state trooper of the Tennessee Highway Patrol. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his arrest, solely on the basis that his arrest "was without a warrant and without probable cause." Defendant did not assert that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop of Defendant. Following a hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court took the matter under advisement. The trial court subsequently entered a written order granting Defendant’s motion to suppress all evidence obtained "following the initial detention and subsequent arrest." The State has appealed, following a nolle prosequi of the indictment. Following a thorough review we reverse the judgment of the trial court, reinstate the charges, and remand for further proceedings.

Marvin Lee Keeling (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of kidnapping, two counts of aggravated burglary, one count of assault causing bodily injury, and one count of assault by offensive touching. After a hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to five years for the kidnapping conviction, five years for each of the aggravated burglary convictions, eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault causing bodily injury conviction, and six months for the assault by offensive touching conviction, all to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of five years. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve one year of his sentence confined in the county jail with five years of probation. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is not sufficient to support his kidnapping conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion; and (3) the trial court erred in denying full probation. Upon our thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Michael Glen Walsh, appeals from his convictions by a Sevier County Circuit Court jury for driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor, violating the implied consent law while his driver’s license was revoked for a previous DUI conviction, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving with a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401, 55 10-406, and 55-50-504 (2012). He received an eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence with 150 days to serve for each of the DUI and the implied consent violation convictions and received a six-month sentence, suspended except for forty-eight hours, for the revoked license conviction, all to be served concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his DUI and implied consent violation convictions and (2) that the trial court erred in sentencing him to serve 150 days. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.