Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

The Petitioner, Curtis Keller, appeals the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Timothy A. Baxter, appeals the Circuit Court of Madison County’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, John Joseph Kratochvil, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder and received an agreed to sentence, out of range, of thirty-five years as a multiple offender. On appeal, he contends that his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to explain the difference between Range I and II sentences, sentencing outside of range, and the elements of the crime; (2) failing to inquire, investigate, or explain how the various circumstance in his case might have led to a competent defense involving "heat of passion"; (3) failing to investigate and move to suppress search warrants issued in the case; and (4) failing to inform the petitioner that the prosecution was statutorily required to provide a Notice of Enhanced Punishment within ten days of trial. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Evetta Mai McGee, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner entered an open plea to one count of rape and was subsequently sentenced to a term of eleven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, she contends that her plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because she did not comprehend that a "best interest" plea was actually a plea of guilty. She further contends that her plea was not proper because trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately prepare and interview witnesses. Following review of the record, the denial of post-conviction relief is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Gregory G. Spiceland, was convicted of one count of initiating the process to manufacture methamphetamine and one count of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to eight years and two years respectively for his convictions, and the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Defendant was ordered to serve a sentence of split confinement with one year of his effective sentence in confinement and the remainder suspended on probation. In this direct appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of split confinement. Specifically, Defendant argues that the trial court should not have found that Defendant was engaged in a pattern of criminal conduct and that Defendant’s failure to complete his presentence report indicated that Defendant would not be successful on probation. Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by not ordering Defendant to serve his sentence on community corrections. Following a review of the record, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Defendant to serve a full year of his sentence by incarceration. We therefore reverse Defendant’s sentence and modify it so that Defendant serves 30 days of his sentence in confinement with the balance of his effective sentence served on probation, and remand to the trial court for entry of a judgment in accordance with this opinion.

Ken Parker (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder and first degree premeditated murder. The trial court merged the first degree premeditated murder conviction into the first degree felony murder conviction and sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial with respect to a police officer’s testimony. Additionally, the Defendant alleges that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

Petitioner, Jarvis McClain, entered a guilty plea in the Shelby County Criminal Court to especially aggravated robbery and received the agreed-upon sentence of thirteen and one-half years in prison as a mitigated offender to be served at 100% release eligibility. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing. In this appeal, petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for several reasons: (1) failing to explain the terms of his plea agreement; (2) failing to explain the range of punishment for the offense for which petitioner was indicted; and (3) failing to disclose to petitioner evidence discovered by the investigator. He also claims that the ineffective assistance of counsel rendered his guilty plea involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Steven Hood, pled guilty to robbery and aggravated assault, Class C felonies, in exchange for an effective sentence of eight years, and the trial court imposed a sentence of incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of community corrections. After review, we affirm the trial court’s sentencing decision.

I respectfully disagree with the conclusion by the majority to vacate the Defendant’s conviction for violating the implied consent law. On appeal, the Defendant specifically argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of violating the implied consent law. The majority vacates the Defendant’s conviction for violating the implied consent law on procedural grounds, an argument not made by the Defendant on appeal.

The Defendant-Appellant, Frank L. Glavin, appeals his convictions for evading arrest, a Class E felony, and violating the noncriminal implied consent law. He argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the aforementioned convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of conviction for evading arrest, and we reverse and vacate the judgment of conviction for violating the noncriminal implied consent law.

David Paul Zwarton ("the Defendant") pleaded guilty to one count of theft of property of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three years, leaving the trial court to determine whether the sentence would be served concurrently or consecutively to a four-year sentence imposed by the Coffee County Circuit Court. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve his three-year sentence consecutively to his Coffee County sentence. The Defendant appealed the trial court’s ruling. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Khalid Bashir, was stopped while driving on I-75 North in Bradley County, Tennessee. Tennessee State Troopers issued a speeding citation and searched the vehicle. During the search, they discovered a large bag of marijuana, cocaine, Ecstasy, and two digital scales. The Bradley County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for speeding; driving on a revoked license, second offense; criminal impersonation; possession of cocaine; possession of marijuana; possession of a Schedule I drug; and possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the vehicle, arguing that the investigatory stop, length of detention, and warrantless search of his vehicle and backpack were unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant appeals the denial of his motion. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the traffic stop was supported by probable cause and the trooper had probable cause to search the vehicle and backpack. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.