Supreme Court Opinions

Format: 04/23/2014
Format: 04/23/2014
01S01-9601-CC-00022
Authoring Judge:
Trial Court Judge:
Supreme Court 06/24/96
01S01-9601-CC-00022
Authoring Judge:
Trial Court Judge:
Supreme Court 06/24/96
02S01-9410-CC-00069
Authoring Judge:
Trial Court Judge:
Supreme Court 06/17/96
02S01-9410-CC-00069
Authoring Judge:
Trial Court Judge:
Supreme Court 06/17/96
02S01-9501-CH-00005
Authoring Judge:
Trial Court Judge:
Supreme Court 06/10/96
02S01-9502-CC-00013
Authoring Judge:
Trial Court Judge:
Supreme Court 06/10/96
01S01-9503-CC-00034
Authoring Judge:
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Sr.
Supreme Court 06/10/96
01S01-9503-CC-00034
Authoring Judge:
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Sr.
Supreme Court 06/10/96
State of Tennesee v. Mario Lamont Wilson
02S01-9505-CC-00045
Authoring Judge: Justice Penny J. White
Trial Court Judge: Judge John Franklin Murchison

A jury convicted defendant, Mario Lamont Wilson, of three counts of aggravated assault and of felony reckless endangerment and possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to commit a felony. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Wilson’s felony reckless endangerment conviction and sentence, but reversed and dismissed the convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a deadly weapon. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it dismissed Wilson’s convictions for aggravated assault.1 Although we conclude that Wilson’s convictions for aggravated assault may not stand, we do not adopt entirely the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Rather, we affirm the dismissal of the aggravated assault charges because the evidence is insufficient to prove that Wilson intentionally and knowingly caused another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury.

Madison County Supreme Court 06/03/96
Charles M. Cary, Jr. v. Cathy Ann Cary
02S01-9505-CV-00035
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

We granted this appeal to determine whether a provision in an antenuptial agreement by which a prospective spouse waives alimony is void because it violates public policy. The trial court held that such a provision in an antenuptial agreement, which waived alimony, was valid and enforceable and, therefore, denied the spouse’s application for alimony. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, holding that the waiver of alimony provision was void as against public policy, and remanded to the trial court to consider whether to award alimony.

Hardeman County Supreme Court 06/03/96
State of Tennessee v. Brian Keith Kimbro
02S01-9503-CR-00028
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett

We review this cause in order to address an issue of first impression: whether attempt to commit felony-murder exists as an offense in Tennessee. We conclude that it does not and affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals reversing the appellee's conviction.

 

 

Shelby County Supreme Court 06/03/96
Ira H. Murphy v. Board of Professional Responsibility
02S01-9503-CH-00031
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John Hill Chisholm

The issue raised by this appeal is whether the petitioner, a disbarred attorney, has satisfied the requirements for reinstatement of his license to practice law contained in Rule 9, § 19.3, Rules of the Supreme Court, by clear and convincing proof. A Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility concluded that the petitioner had failed to carry the burden of proof for reinstatement. The Chancery Court, however, reviewed the Hearing Panel decision and held the petitioner was entitled to "conditional reinstatement" of his license to practice law.
 

Shelby County Supreme Court 06/03/96
State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom AKA Otis Smith - Concurring/Dissenting
02-S-01-9502-CR-00014
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge:

I fully concur in the majority’s decision affirming the conviction in this case.  I also agree with the majority that the trial court’s refusal to admit into evidence as mitigation the testimony of Dr. John Hutson was error which requires a reversal and a remand for re-sentencing. However, I dissent from the majority’s analysis of the constitutionality and sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating circumstance, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5), as amended in 1989.

Shelby County Supreme Court 06/03/96
State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom - Concurring/Dissenting
02S01-9502-CR-00014
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge:

I fully concur in the majority’s decision affirming the conviction in this case. I also agree with the majority that the trial court’s refusal to admit into evidence as mitigation the testimony of Dr. John Hutson was error which requires a reversal and a remand for re-sentencing. However, I dissent from the majority’s analysis of the constitutionality and sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating circumstance, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5), as amended in 1989.

Jackson County Supreme Court 06/03/96