Supreme Court Opinions

Format: 11/28/2014
Format: 11/28/2014
Joseph Carl Owens v. Truckstops of America, Truckstops of America, Inc. v. B. Michael Design, Inc. and Vitro Products, Inc. - Dissenting
01S01-9408-CV-00077
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marietta M. Shipley

Based on the plaintiff's expectations at the time he filed this lawsuit in 1988, I agree with the majority that, in this transition case, it is reasonable to permit the plaintiff to recover from the defendants that he named in his complaint ("Truckstops") all of his damages that were proximately caused by Truckstops and that were not attributable to the plaintiff's own fault (if any). I also agree with the majority that it is fair in this transition case to permit Truckstops to receive contribution from the parties that were named by Truckstops as third-party defendants. However, I believe that the contribution should be based on the parties' respective percentages of fault, and that this method should apply not only to the negligence claims set forth in the thirdparty complaint, but to the strict products liability claim as well. If liability were thus linked to fault on each claim in the third-party complaint, each defendant (including the third-party defendants) would be liable only for the percentage of the plaintiff's damages that was caused by that defendant's fault, and the doctrine of joint and several liability would have no application.

Davidson County Supreme Court 01/29/96
Guy Alexander, Jr., Royce Taylor, and Skyline Apartments Partnership v. Third National Bank
01S01-9411-CV-00147
Authoring Judge: Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barbara N. Haynes

This case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground the suit is barred by the three year statute of limitations. This Court finds the essential cause of action alleged is breach of contract rather than injury to property and, therefore, the applicable limitation period is six years rather than three years.

Davidson County Supreme Court 01/22/96
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
Authoring Judge:
Trial Court Judge: Harold Wimberly
Supreme Court 01/22/96
01S01-9502-CV-00029
Authoring Judge:
Trial Court Judge:
Supreme Court 01/22/96
01S01-9502-CV-00029
Authoring Judge:
Trial Court Judge:
Supreme Court 01/22/96
03S01-9404-CV-00019
Authoring Judge:
Trial Court Judge:
Supreme Court 01/22/96
03S01-9410-CH-00091
Authoring Judge:
Trial Court Judge:
Supreme Court 01/16/96
03S01-9502-CV-00012
Authoring Judge:
Trial Court Judge: Robert M. Summitt
Supreme Court 12/28/95
03S01-9412-CH-00121
Authoring Judge:
Trial Court Judge: Billy Joe White
Campbell County Supreme Court 12/28/95
01S01-9502-CC-00028
Authoring Judge:
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull
Supreme Court 12/28/95
Harold Richardson v. Tennessee Board of Dentistry - Concurring
01S01-9502-CH-00027
Authoring Judge: Justice Penny J. White
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor C. Allen High

At issue in this appeal by the Board of Dentistry is the validity and constitutionality of a proposed civil penalty against Harold Richardson for practicing dentistry and operating a dental clinic without a license. Also  called into question is the authority of the Davidson County Chancery Court to resolve, on judicial review of an administrative order, constitutional issues that were not addressed in the administrative order. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the Chancery Court has jurisdiction to  consider constitutional issues not addressed in the administrative  proceeding. As a result, the Chancery Court's resolution of those issues in the first Chancery Court proceeding from which Richardson did not appeal, bars consideration of those issues. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, reversed, and this matter is remanded to the Board of Dentistry for further proceedings.

Davidson County Supreme Court 12/28/95
Norma Sue Harrison v. James Nesbitt Harrison - Concurring
01S01-9412-CV-00l53
Authoring Judge: Justice Reid
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Robert E. Corlew, III

This divorce case presents for review the judgment of the Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court, that a one-half undivided interest in a tract of real property is marital property within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 4-121(b)(1)(B) (1991). This Court finds that the interest is the husband's separate property, not marital property, thus requiring that the Court of Appeals' decision be reversed.

Rutherford County Supreme Court 12/18/95
01S01-9503-PB-00044
Authoring Judge:
Trial Court Judge: James R. Everett
Supreme Court 12/18/95