Supreme Court Opinions

Format: 08/23/2014
Format: 08/23/2014
Roy E. Keough v. State of Tennessee
W2008-01916-SC-R11-PD
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carolyn Blackett

We granted permission to appeal in this post-conviction capital case to consider whether the courts below erred in holding that the state and federal constitutional right against self incrimination does not afford a post-conviction petitioner who chooses to testify the right to limit the scope of the State’s cross-examination. However, we need not decide whether and in what manner the constitutional right against self-incrimination applies in the post conviction context because this appeal can be resolved on non-constitutional grounds. We have concluded that the scope of cross-examination of a post-conviction petitioner is governed by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, section 8(C)(1)(d). The judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals are vacated, and this matter is remanded for a new post-conviction hearing at which Petitioner shall be afforded the right to testify subject to the limited scope cross-examination provided by Rule 28, section 8(C)(1)(d).

Shelby County Supreme Court 12/09/11
Dorothy King, et al v. Virginia Betts, et al - Concurring
M2009-00117-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Claudia Bonnyman

I concur in Parts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII of the majority opinion. I do not concur in Part IV of the opinion addressing whether federal or state procedural rules should apply to a qualified immunity defense because the issue of whether federal or state procedural law applies is not properly before this Court. See Fayne v. Vincent, 301 S.W.3d 162, 171 (Tenn. 2009).

Davidson County Supreme Court 11/18/11
Dorothy King, et al v. Virginia Betts, et al
M2009-00117-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Claudia Bonnyman

This appeal involves the assertion of the qualified immunity defense in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2008) action filed in state court. A registered nurse employed at a state psychiatric facility publicly disagreed with a change in the facility’s procedures for administering prescription medications at night and on the weekend. When the facility declined to change its procedures, the nurse filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the Chancery Court for Davidson County against various officials and employees of the then Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, alleging the existence of a hostile work environment and retaliation for the exercise of her constitutionally protected free speech rights. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the nurse’s First Amendment claim and a motion for judgment on the pleadings asserting qualified immunity. The trial court, after considering the products of two years of discovery, granted both of the defendants’ motions and dismissed the nurse’s complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court with regard to both motions based on its conclusion that material issues of fact precluded both motions. King v. Betts, No. M2009-00117-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4893590 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2009). We granted the defendants’ Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal to address the procedure for the consideration of qualified immunity defenses in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions filed in Tennessee’s courts and to determine whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the facts of this case. We have determined that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the nurse has failed to demonstrate that the defendants’ response to her criticism of the changes in the procedures for administering prescription medications violated a clearly established right.

Davidson County Supreme Court 11/18/11
Henry Zillon Felts v. State of Tennessee
M2009-00639-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dee David Gay

In this post-conviction appeal, we must determine whether Petitioner Henry Zillon Felts was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his trial for aggravated burglary and attempted first degree murder. The post-conviction court vacated Petitioner’s convictions after concluding that trial counsel’s representation was ineffective because he: (1) pursued self-defense exclusively, rather than pursuing self-defense along with the alternative strategy of convincing the jury to convict Petitioner of the lesser-included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter, and (2) failed to keep a promise to the jury made during opening statements that Petitioner would testify at trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that the courts below erred by concluding that trial counsel performed deficiently. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case for reinstatement of Petitioner’s convictions.
 

Sumner County Supreme Court 11/10/11
Mark D. Talley v. Board of Professional Responsibility - Concurring
W2010-02072-SC-R3-BP
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James F. Butler

I concur in the judgment of the Court, but I do not concur in the reasoning of the majority opinion.

Shelby County Supreme Court 10/26/11
Mark D. Talley v. Board of Professional Responsibility
W2010-02072-SC-R3-BP
Authoring Judge: Justice William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James F. Butler

This appeal involves a disciplinaryproceeding against a Memphis lawyer who pleaded guilty in the Criminal Court for Shelby County to facilitating the felonious violation of the Tennessee Securities Act. After a Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel recommended that he be disbarred, the lawyer filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Shelby County seeking judicial review of the hearing panel’s decision. The trial court affirmed the recommendation of the hearing panel, and the lawyer appealed to this Court. On appeal, the Board of Professional Responsibility asserts that the lawyer’s petition should be dismissed because his petition for writ of certiorari did not contain the recitation required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-106 (2000). For his part, the lawyer asserts that the punishment of disbarment is excessive. We have determined that the lawyer’s deficient petition for writ of certiorari does not prevent the courts from reviewing the hearing panel’s decision. We have also determined that the record fully supports the hearing panel’s findings and that disbarring the lawyer is not an excessive punishment in light of the facts and circumstances of this case.

Shelby County Supreme Court 10/26/11
Federal Insurance Company a/s/o Robert and Joanie Emerson v. Martin Edward Winters, d/b/a Winters Roofing Company
E2009-02065-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Neil Thomas, III

The defendant contractor entered into a contract to replace a roof. When the newly installed roof developed leaks, the defendant hired an independent contractor to make the necessary repairs. While performing the work, the independent contractor caused a fire, resulting in an $871,069.73 insurance claim by the homeowners. As subrogor to the homeowners’ rights and claims arising out of the fire, the plaintiff insurance company sued the defendant in both tort and in contract. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that because he had subcontracted the work, he could not be liable. The trial court granted the motion on both the negligence and breach of contract claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant had a non-delegable contractual duty to perform the roofing services in a careful, skillful, and workmanlike manner. This Court granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal in order to determine the propriety of the claim under the theory of contract. Because the defendant had an implied non-delegable duty to install the roof in a careful, skillful, diligent, and workmanlike manner, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Hamilton County Supreme Court 10/25/11
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lee Davis
M2008-01216-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge John D. Wooten, Jr.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, carjacking, attempt to commit especially aggravated kidnapping, and attempt to commit first degree murder. At issue is the legality of the stop of a vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger, and whether the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for attempt to commit first degree murder. We conclude that reasonable suspicion existed to permit the officers to conduct a brief investigatory stop of the car in which the defendant was a passenger. Further, we find there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendant and his fellow perpetrator planned and intended to kill the victim, and that the defendant’s conduct, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, constituted a substantial step sufficient to support a conviction for attempted murder. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

Trousdale County Supreme Court 10/17/11
Scott M. Craig v. David Mills, Warden - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
E2010-00487-SC-R11-HC
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Eugene Eblen

In July 1998, a Bradley County jury convicted Scott M. Craig (“petitioner”) of two counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated kidnapping and assessed a twentyfive thousand dollar ($25,000) fine on one of the aggravated rape convictions and twenty thousand dollar ($20,000) fines on each of the other convictions, for aggregate fines of sixtyfive thousand dollars ($65,000). The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of fifteen years for the aggravated rape convictions and a consecutive eight-year sentence for the aggravated kidnapping conviction, for an aggregate sentence of twenty-three years. On July 27, 1998, judgments were entered reflecting each conviction and sentence; however, these judgments did not reflect the fines imposed by the jury, nor did these judgments reflect imposition of any sexual offense surcharge. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-709 (2010).

Morgan County Supreme Court 10/14/11
State of Tennessee v. Alfred Turner
W2007-00891-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Otis Higgs, Jr.

The defendant was indicted for a murder that occurred nearly ten years prior to his arrest. The defendant’s theory of the case implicated two other men as the individuals responsible for the murder. These men previously had been tried and acquitted of the murder. Over the objection of the defendant, the State introduced evidence of the prior acquittals of the other men. A jury convicted the defendant of facilitation of first degree murder. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the evidence of the acquittals of the other parties was irrelevant and that the erroneous admission of the evidence was not harmless. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Shelby County Supreme Court 10/12/11
Joseph Edward Rich, M.D. v. Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners - Dissenting
M2009-00813-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol McCoy

The majority asserts that the Board must “articulate what the standard of care is in its deliberations.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-214(g)(2010). To this end, the majority today has found “the standard of care” to be unambiguous. I also find this language to be unambiguous. My reading of Tennessee Code Annotated section 63-6-214(g), however, compels a different conclusion.

Davidson County Supreme Court 10/10/11
Joseph Edward Rich, M.D. v. Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners
M2009-00813-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol McCoy

This is an appeal from an administrative hearing wherein the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners suspended a physician’s medical license for one year and imposed other conditions after finding that, among other things, the physician had violated Tennessee Code Annotated sections 63-6-214(b)(1),(4), and (12) (2010). Upon review, the trial court affirmed the Board’s ruling; however, because the Board failed to articulate the applicable standard of care in its deliberations, the Court of Appeals reversed the Board’s ruling. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Board was required to articulate the standard of care in its deliberations. Therefore, we vacate the ruling of the trial court to the extent that it affirms the Board’s decision that the physician violated Tennessee Code Annotated sections 63-6-214(b)(1),(4), and (12). However, rather than reversing the Board’s decisions, we are remanding the matter to the Board and instructing it to conduct deliberations based on the existing record and articulate the applicable standard of care as required by the statute.

Davidson County Supreme Court 10/10/11
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Lynn Parker
E2008-02541-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben W. Hooper II

We granted this appeal by the State to determine if the defendant’s conviction of second degree murder should be affirmed pursuant to State v. Mellons, 557 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. 1977), despite insufficient evidence to support it. We hold that Mellons does not control the outcome of this case. We also hold that sufficient proof must support every element of the offense of which a defendant is convicted, even where the conviction offense is charged as a lesser-included offense and sufficient proof supports the greater offense. In this case, the trial court erred in charging the jury with second degree murder as a lesser-included offense of first degree felony murder. Because the proof is not sufficient to support it, we must reverse and vacate the conviction of second degree murder. However, because the proof is sufficient to support the offense of reckless homicide, we remand this matter to the trial court for (1) entry of an amended judgment reflecting a conviction of reckless homicide, and (2) sentencing on reckless homicide. The defendant is entitled to no relief on his remaining issues. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Cocke County Supreme Court 09/23/11