Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51 for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Lori Turner (“Employee”) sought reconsideration of her prior workers’ compensation settlement pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2). Her claim had been settled for 14% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the body as a whole, based upon a 7% anatomical impairment. Upon reconsideration, the trial court awarded an additional 21% PPD, for a total of 35% PPD to the body as a whole. Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc. (“Employer”) has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the amount of the award. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

In this workers’ compensation action, the trial court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the employee’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-203, because the employee had not filed a request for benefit review conference within one year of the date of injury. The employee, Joe Lynn Hughes, has appealed, contending that the statute was tolled by his timely filing of a request for assistance. We agree, reverse the grant of summary judgment, and remand the case to the trial court

Employee developed carpal tunnel syndrome while employed as a factory worker by Johnson Controls, Inc. (“JCI”). After employee gave notice of her injury and received some treatment, Manufacturers Industrial Group (“MIG”) bought the factory and became her employer. She had surgery on both arms and returned to work, but was then permanently laid off. Employee brought an action against both JCI and MIG for workers’ compensation benefits due to injuries sustained to her right and left hands and wrists. JCI and MIG each argued that the other should be liable for her workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court found that MIG was liable and awarded 48% permanent partial disability to both arms. MIG appealed. It contends that the trial court erred by assigning liability to it  and by adopting theimpairment rating of a physician chosen through the Medical Impairment Registry. MIG further argues that the award was excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ricky Mayes (“Employee”) sustained a compensable injury to his spine. His claim against Peebles, Inc. (“Employer”) was settled in accordance with the workers’ compensation statute. His authorized treating physician subsequently recommended a surgical procedure. Employer’s medical utilization review provider declined to approve the procedure. After an initial administrative appeal was denied, Employee filed a motion in the trial court, seeking to compel Employer to authorize the procedure. The trial court granted the motion, and awarded attorney’s fees to Employee. On appeal, Employer argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction, because Employee did not exhaust his administrative appeals, and that the trial court erred by awarding attorney’s fees. We affirm the judgment.

The owner and operator of a tractor-trailer filed a workers' compensation claim against a common carrier for injuries that he incurred while attempting to verify a load to transport to another location. The trial court ruled that the owner/operator, while an independent contractor, was entitled to workers' compensation benefits by virtue of a written contract between the parties extending coverage, as permitted by statute. The trial court reserved judgment on the award and permitted an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted the appeal and referred it to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of fact made by the trial court, the judgment is affirmed. The cause is remanded to the trial court for the disposition of the remaining issues.

The trial court granted the employee’s post-judgment motion to compel his employer to provide certain medical treatment. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that the proposed treatment was related to the work injury. We affirm the judgment.

In this workers’ compensation action, employee sought benefits for injuries to his hips, shoulders, and feet. The trial court awarded benefits for injuries to his shoulders and feet but found that he failed to give timely notice of his bilateral hip injuries to his employer and dismissed those claims. Employee has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in finding that he did not provide timely notice of his hip injuries and that the complaint is barred by the statute of limitations. He requests that temporary disability, medical, and permanent disability benefits be awarded for those claims. Employer argues that the trial court erred in its calculation of the amount to be set off for social security retirement benefits. We conclude that the employee gave sufficient notice of his hip injuries to satisfy the requirements of the workers’ compensation statute. However, we find that those claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

Employee alleged that he sustained hearing loss as a result of his work for employer. He filed a civil action 94 days after an impasse was reached at a benefit review conference. The trial court granted employer’s motion to dismiss on the basis of the 90-day statute of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-203(g)(1) (2008). On appeal, employee contends that the report of the benefit review conference was never “filed with the commissioner” of Labor and Workforce Development as required by the statute and that the 90-day limitation period therefore never began to run. We affirm the judgment.