Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

Appellate Court Opinions

Format: 09/22/2014
Format: 09/22/2014
Henry County Medical Center, v. Henry Gronski, M.D.
02A01-9412-CV-00279

This is a breach of contract action brought by Henry County Medical Center (HCMC) against Henry Gronski, M.D. (Gronski). In response, Gronski admitted the amounts owed to HCMC under the contract but claimed that he was owed a larger amount as set-off. The trial court awarded HCMC a judgment of $44,900.40 on the contract and awarded Gronski $56,204 as set-off. The court also ordered HCMC to pay Gronski's attorney's fees and accountant fees. HCMC appeals the court’s award of set-off to Gronski as well as the award of attorney’s and accountant fees. We affirm the trial court on all issues.

Henry County Court of Appeals 09/09/96
Eldred L. Reid v. Jerry Stover and Charles Noles
02A01-9601-CV-00016

Plaintiff, Eldred Reid, is a prisoner currently incarcerated at the Northwest 2 Correctional Center in Tiptonville, Tennessee. Plaintiff brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that various officials at the correctional center violated his constitutional rights.

Lake County Court of Appeals 09/09/96
Charles M. Cary, Jr., v. Cathy Ann Cary
02S01-9505-CV-00035

Upon consideration of the appellant’s motion to amend the judgment to delete the award of attorney fees, the Court concludes that the motion is without merit and should be denied. It is so ORDERED.
 

Jackson County Supreme Court 09/09/96
Harold Wayne Gibson, and wife, Sylvia Gibson, v. Kit G. McGlothlin, D/B/A Kit McGlothlin Builders, Inc., et al.
03A01-9601-CH-00019

This is an action for damages for breach of a construction contract and of an implied warranty of good workmanship and materials and for negligent construction.

Sullivan County Court of Appeals 09/09/96
Herman Davis and wife, Darnell Davis, v. Paul A. Hatcher, Sr., M.D.
03A01-9601-CV-00016

This malpractice action was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. It arose from a routine prostate resection which went awry, resulting in adverse consequences to the plaintiff. A device referred to as a resectoscope manufactured by the Circon ACMI Ohio Manufacturing Company,1 malfunctioned while being used by and under the control of the defendant, Dr. Paul Hatcher [hereafter, the “defendant”]. It is not disputed that a portion of the penis of the plaintiff, Herman
Davis [hereafter, “plaintiff”], was either chemically, thermally or electrically burned away, with disastrous results unnecessary here to be recounted.

Knox County Court of Appeals 09/09/96
Herman Davis and wife, Darnell Davis, v. Paul A. Hatcher, Sr., M.D.
03A01-9601-CV-00016

This malpractice action was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. It arose from a routine prostate resection which went awry, resulting in adverse consequences to the plaintiff. A device referred to as a resectoscope manufactured by the Circon ACMI Ohio Manufacturing Company,1 malfunctioned while being used by and under the control of the defendant, Dr. Paul Hatcher [hereafter, the “defendant”]. It is not disputed that a portion of the penis of the plaintiff, Herman Davis [hereafter, “plaintiff”], was either chemically, thermally or electrically burned away, with disastrous results unnecessary here to be recounted.

Knox County Court of Appeals 09/09/96
State of Tennessee vs. Hans Vincent Morris
03C01-9406-CR-00218

The State has appealed from a ruling of the Criminal Court of Anderson County in which the trial court ruled that the Juvenile Court of Anderson County did not have jurisdiction to require a juvenile traffic offender to attend psychological counseling.

Anderson County Court of Criminal Appeals 09/09/96
Charles E . Carey v. Carolina Freight Carriers
02S01-9506-CH-00050
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its appeal, the employer contends that the evidence does not support the trial court's award of seventy percent (7%) to the lower extremity and that the trial court erred in computing the employee's average weekly wage at $273. instead of $22.21 per week. The panel concludes that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's assessment of permanent disability and modifies th e award to thirty-five percen t (35%) to the lower e xtremity. Prope rly computed, the employee's average weekly wage is $22.21 per week. Charles E. Carey ("Carey") was injured on December 27, 1991, when a bank vault weighing five hundred pounds fell off a fork lift and struck the front part of his left thigh. He was initially treated by Dr. R. Michael Cobb, an orthopedic surgeon, who suspected a torn ligament in Carey's knee. Dr. Cobb later concluded, however, that the ligament was not torn and that surgery was not needed. In February, 1992, Carey began to complain of numbness in his toes, although Dr. Cobb was unable to find any indication of injury to the sciatic nerve, which provides feeling to the toes. Carey was given a note to return to work on March 1, 1992. Upon examination on March 16, 1992, Carey's range of motion was excellent and his strength appeared to be normal. He advised Dr. Cobb that he was hav ing no pro blem at w ork. A ne rve cond uction study, pe rformed as a result of the c ompla ints of to e num bness, s howe d no sig n of inju ry to the sc iatic nerv e. Carey was given no permanent physical anatomical impairment and was discharged from Dr. Cobb's care on March 16, 1992. When he returned to work in March, Carey performed the same duties that 2
Madison County Workers Compensation Panel 09/09/96
Charles E . Carey v. Carolina Freight Carriers
02S01-9506-CH-00050
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its appeal, the employer contends that the evidence does not support the trial court's award of seventy percent (7%) to the lower extremity and that the trial court erred in computing the employee's average weekly wage at $273. instead of $22.21 per week. The panel concludes that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's assessment of permanent disability and modifies th e award to thirty-five percen t (35%) to the lower e xtremity. Prope rly computed, the employee's average weekly wage is $22.21 per week. Charles E. Carey ("Carey") was injured on December 27, 1991, when a bank vault weighing five hundred pounds fell off a fork lift and struck the front part of his left thigh. He was initially treated by Dr. R. Michael Cobb, an orthopedic surgeon, who suspected a torn ligament in Carey's knee. Dr. Cobb later concluded, however, that the ligament was not torn and that surgery was not needed. In February, 1992, Carey began to complain of numbness in his toes, although Dr. Cobb was unable to find any indication of injury to the sciatic nerve, which provides feeling to the toes. Carey was given a note to return to work on March 1, 1992. Upon examination on March 16, 1992, Carey's range of motion was excellent and his strength appeared to be normal. He advised Dr. Cobb that he was hav ing no pro blem at w ork. A ne rve cond uction study, pe rformed as a result of the c ompla ints of to e num bness, s howe d no sig n of inju ry to the sc iatic nerv e. Carey was given no permanent physical anatomical impairment and was discharged from Dr. Cobb's care on March 16, 1992. When he returned to work in March, Carey performed the same duties that 2
Madison County Workers Compensation Panel 09/09/96
John Ivory, Jr. v. Emerson Motor Company
02S01-9505-CH-00042
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Our scope of review of findings of fact by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn.Code Ann. _ 5-6-22 5(e)(2). The employee contends the trial court erred in: 1. Failing to assign perman ent partial disability to the right arm as opposed to the right hand; and 2. Limiting the award o f perman ent partial disab ility benefits to 55% to the right hand. We affirm the trial court in all respects. The plain tiff, John Ivo ry, Jr., ("Ivory") is 25 years o f age with an eleven th grade education. He received a G.E.D and successfully completed Job Corps training in brick masonry. His previous work experience included upholstering furniture, w orking as a construction laborer and as a produ ction line w orker at a chee se fa ctor y. On August 15, 1992, Ivory was repairing a die cast machine for Emerson Motor Company when the machine activated, injuring the fingers of his right hand. Ivory was treated by Dr. Frederick Torstrick, an orthopedic surgeon, for crush injuries to the index, long and ring fingers, fractures to the index and ring fingers, and longitudinal lacerations to the top and bottom of his hand. A later surgical procedure performed to improve movement required incisions in each of the injured fingers, the removal of adhesions between the tendon and underlying bone and cutting of some of the tissues of the capsule of the joints. Ivory was referred to a work ha rdening p rogram w here there w as some q uestion of h is coope ration. 2
Gibson County Workers Compensation Panel 09/09/96
John Ivory, Jr. v. Emerson Motor Company
02S01-9505-CH-00042
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Our scope of review of findings of fact by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn.Code Ann. _ 5-6-22 5(e)(2). The employee contends the trial court erred in: 1. Failing to assign perman ent partial disability to the right arm as opposed to the right hand; and 2. Limiting the award o f perman ent partial disab ility benefits to 55% to the right hand. We affirm the trial court in all respects. The plain tiff, John Ivo ry, Jr., ("Ivory") is 25 years o f age with an eleven th grade education. He received a G.E.D and successfully completed Job Corps training in brick masonry. His previous work experience included upholstering furniture, w orking as a construction laborer and as a produ ction line w orker at a chee se fa ctor y. On August 15, 1992, Ivory was repairing a die cast machine for Emerson Motor Company when the machine activated, injuring the fingers of his right hand. Ivory was treated by Dr. Frederick Torstrick, an orthopedic surgeon, for crush injuries to the index, long and ring fingers, fractures to the index and ring fingers, and longitudinal lacerations to the top and bottom of his hand. A later surgical procedure performed to improve movement required incisions in each of the injured fingers, the removal of adhesions between the tendon and underlying bone and cutting of some of the tissues of the capsule of the joints. Ivory was referred to a work ha rdening p rogram w here there w as some q uestion of h is coope ration. 2
Gibson County Workers Compensation Panel 09/09/96
Jimmy Johnson v. WaUSAu Insurance Company
02S01-9601-CH-00008
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court, in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Jimmy Johnson ("plaintiff") has appealed the trial court's dismissal of his suit for workers' compensation benefits on the grounds that plaintiff failed to prove that he sustained an injury arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment by preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiff was employed by Gurien Finishing Corporation ("Gurien"), who was insured by defendant, Wausau Insurance Company. For the foregoing reasons, we find no error and affirm. Plaintiff was employed at Gurien as a washer operator as part of Gurien's manufacturing process of stonewashed jeans. Plaintiff alleges that on August 1, 1993, he injured his lower back while pulling open a washer door that had been jammed with a rock. He stated that he did not report the injury at the time of the accident because it felt more like a cramp. When he woke up in pain the following morning, plaintiff testified that he reported the accident to his shift manager, Cindy Long. He stated that he advised Long that he hurt himself jerking on a washer door. Plaintiff was treated by his personal physician, Dr. Philip Sherman, on August 16, 1993. He gave Dr. Sherman a history of hurting his back while pulling machines at work. Plaintiff complained to Dr. Sherman of low back pain with some pain radiating into his legs, with the pain being worse in his left leg than his right. Dr. Sherman diagnosed pl aintiff as suffering from lumbosacral strain and prescribed pain medication. In November 1993 plaintiff returned to Dr. Sherman with compl aints of 2
Johnson County Workers Compensation Panel 09/09/96
Jimmy Johnson v. WaUSAu Insurance Company
02S01-9601-CH-00008
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court, in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Jimmy Johnson ("plaintiff") has appealed the trial court's dismissal of his suit for workers' compensation benefits on the grounds that plaintiff failed to prove that he sustained an injury arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment by preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiff was employed by Gurien Finishing Corporation ("Gurien"), who was insured by defendant, Wausau Insurance Company. For the foregoing reasons, we find no error and affirm. Plaintiff was employed at Gurien as a washer operator as part of Gurien's manufacturing process of stonewashed jeans. Plaintiff alleges that on August 1, 1993, he injured his lower back while pulling open a washer door that had been jammed with a rock. He stated that he did not report the injury at the time of the accident because it felt more like a cramp. When he woke up in pain the following morning, plaintiff testified that he reported the accident to his shift manager, Cindy Long. He stated that he advised Long that he hurt himself jerking on a washer door. Plaintiff was treated by his personal physician, Dr. Philip Sherman, on August 16, 1993. He gave Dr. Sherman a history of hurting his back while pulling machines at work. Plaintiff complained to Dr. Sherman of low back pain with some pain radiating into his legs, with the pain being worse in his left leg than his right. Dr. Sherman diagnosed pl aintiff as suffering from lumbosacral strain and prescribed pain medication. In November 1993 plaintiff returned to Dr. Sherman with compl aints of 2
Johnson County Workers Compensation Panel 09/09/96
Mark Anthony Parker v. National Surety Corporation
02S01-9601-CH-00004
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case the first employer appeals the ruling of the trial court that the injury occurred during his term of employment with the first employer. The trial court found no second injury after April 1 and awarded benefits against the first employer. The second issue is raised by Appellant to the awarding of 4% to each arm. We affirm the findings of the trial court. The Plaintiff's carpal tunnel symptoms began in the right hand "at the beginning of the 9's." (T. at 24). The left hand became symptomatic "a year or so later." (T. P. 25). His symptoms became worse with time. (T.P. 25). "Q. . . .(t)hat you went to the doctor finally when it got so bad that you couldn't stand it. Is that correct? A. Yes, ma'am." (T. P. 39). "Q. . . .(t)hat was while you were working for the first employer? A. Yes, ma'am." (T. P. 39). The Plaintiff had a conversation with the second employer's representative a few days before the second employer became responsible and reported a work related injury while working for the first employer. (T. P. 4). The complaint here was filed alleging a February 1994 injury. The second employer took over on April 1, 1994. The employee further testified that, "Q Activities caused you to experience pain in your hands? 1
Madison County Workers Compensation Panel 09/09/96
Mark Anthony Parker v. National Surety Corporation
02S01-9601-CH-00004
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case the first employer appeals the ruling of the trial court that the injury occurred during his term of employment with the first employer. The trial court found no second injury after April 1 and awarded benefits against the first employer. The second issue is raised by Appellant to the awarding of 4% to each arm. We affirm the findings of the trial court. The Plaintiff's carpal tunnel symptoms began in the right hand "at the beginning of the 9's." (T. at 24). The left hand became symptomatic "a year or so later." (T. P. 25). His symptoms became worse with time. (T.P. 25). "Q. . . .(t)hat you went to the doctor finally when it got so bad that you couldn't stand it. Is that correct? A. Yes, ma'am." (T. P. 39). "Q. . . .(t)hat was while you were working for the first employer? A. Yes, ma'am." (T. P. 39). The Plaintiff had a conversation with the second employer's representative a few days before the second employer became responsible and reported a work related injury while working for the first employer. (T. P. 4). The complaint here was filed alleging a February 1994 injury. The second employer took over on April 1, 1994. The employee further testified that, "Q Activities caused you to experience pain in your hands? 1
Madison County Workers Compensation Panel 09/09/96
Joseph Tyree Glanton, v. Brenda Richardson Glanton (Cherry)
01A01-9601-PB-00013

This appeal involves a post-divorce contempt proceeding. The appellant, Mrs. Brenda Cherry, filed an unverified complaint in the Probate Court for Davidson County seeking to recover unpaid child support from her former husband, Mr. Songoleke Kurante Kotunu (formerly Joseph Tyree Glanton). Mr. Kotunu filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing the Complaint was defective since Mrs. Cherry had not verified it. The probate court agreed with Mr. Kotunu, and dismissed Mrs. Cherry’s suit. The court also awarded Mr. Kotunu his attorneys fees. Mrs. Cherry asserts on appeal that the probate court erred by requiring her to have verified her complaint, and in granting Mr. Kotunu’s attorneys fees. We partially disagree with Mrs. Cherry, and therefore affirm the probate court in part.

Davidson County Court of Appeals 09/06/96
Douglas E. Samuelson, as the Natural Father and Personal Representative of Kevin L. Samuelson, v. Cecil E. McMurtry, M.D., et al.
01A01-9602-CV-00060

In this wrongful death case we have determined that when the plaintiffappellant accepted a jury verdict finding the decedent was forty-nine percent at fault, that finding became binding in the appeal of the trial judge’s action in dismissing another defendant on the day of the trial. We, therefore, pretermit the issues raised by the appellant and affirm the judgment below.

Davidson County Court of Appeals 09/06/96
Douglas E. Samuelson and Kevin L. Samuelson v.Cecil E. McMurtry, M.D., et. al. - Dissenting
01-A-01-9602-CV-00060

This appeal involves one of the central principles of our comparative fault system - that all persons involved in an occurrence giving rise to injury or damages should have their rights and liabilities determined in one action. Douglas Samuelson perfected this appeal solely to obtain appellate review  of the summary dismissal of his malpractice claim against one of  several defendants on the day of trial. Rather than deciding this question, the majority has decided that the jury’s verdict with regard to the remaining parties somehow forecloses Mr. Samuelson from ever obtaining relief from the defendant who was removed from the case even before the trial started. I cannot agree with this decision.

Davidson County Court of Appeals 09/06/96
Allen E. Cole, v. Tennessee Board of Paroles
01A01-9605-CH-00216

This is an appeal by petitioner, Allen B. Cole, from the judgment of the Chancery Court of Davidson County granting the motion to dismiss of respondent, the Tennessee Board of Paroles ("the Board").

Davidson County Court of Appeals 09/06/96
Allen B. Cole, v. Tennessee Board of Paroles
01A01-9605-CH-00216

Even though I concur completely with Judge Lewis’s opinion, I have prepared this separate opinion to elaborate further on the procedure whereby a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is converted to a motion for summary judgment. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) requires this conversion whenever “matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the [trial] court.”

Court of Appeals 09/06/96
Afsoon Vafaie (formerly) Jane Doe, v. Walter R. Owens, III and wife, Cheryl Roberts Owens
01A01-9510-CV-00472

In this case, Plaintiff-Appellant, Dr. Afsoon Vafaie Elmore, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee, Dr. Walter R. Owens, III, with respect to Plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Owens for assault, malicious harassment and civil conspiracy. Plaintiff also appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee, Cheryl Roberts Owens as to Plaintiff’s claims against Mrs. Owens for assault, malicious harassment, outrageous conduct and civil conspiracy. Plaintiff further appeals certain evidentiary rulings made by the trial court during the course of Plaintiff’s jury trial against Dr. Owens in which the Plaintiff sought to recover damages for severe emotional distress, arising from the alleged outrageous conduct of Dr. JuOwens.

Davidson County Court of Appeals 09/06/96
State of Tennessee v. Gary Harris
03C01-9510-CC-00319

A jury found Gary Harris guilty of manufacturing marijuana in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated 39-17-417. Harris appeals and presents the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction; and
II. Whether the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence.

We affirm.

Grainger County Court of Criminal Appeals 09/06/96
State of Tennessee v. Alfred B. Rollins, et al. - Concurring
01C01-9304-CR-1282

I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion. I write separately, though, to express my strong belief that the appellant’s conduct in this case is free of any blame, given the context of the question in issue. In this respect, whether I or anyone else would have found a more circumspect way to prove the point or make a record is largely irrelevant. Likewise, whether all the evidence -- viewed in hindsight -- actually proved the points sought to be proved relative to the appellant’s question is largely irrelevant.

Davidson County Court of Criminal Appeals 09/05/96
Gary Allen Ferrell v. Batesville Casket Company
01S01-9512-CV-00218
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint as barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff appeals this ruling. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff reported problems with swelling, pain and numbness in his right arm to his supervisor in June or July 1991. These problems occurred after using a pneumatic sander at work which plaintiff alleged was defective. He went to the company doctor about a week after he reported these problems to his employer. The company doctor advised him that his problems with his right arm were the result of his use of the pneumatic sander and further advised him to forever avoid using vibrating tools with his right hand. Plaintiff continued to have the same problems with his right arm and experienced exacerbations of his pain whenever he used a vibrating tool. He continued to see physicians, by referral from defendants and on his own. No proof was offered as to whether the defendants had paid any medical expenses for the plaintiff in relation to his alleged injury within a year of his filing this complaint in March 21, 1994. The trial judge held that there was no question in the court's mind that the plaintiff had known since June/July 1991 that he had a work-related injury and that the action was dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. Our review is de novo on the record, accompanied by the presumption that the factual findings of the trial court are correct. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225 (e)(2). TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-23 provides: The right to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law shall be forever barred, unless within one (1) year after the accident resulting in injury . . . occurred the notice required by _ 5-6-22 is given the employer and a claim for compensation under the provisions of this chapter is filed with the tribunal having jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter; provided, that if 2
Coffee County Workers Compensation Panel 09/05/96
Gary Allen Ferrell v. Batesville Casket Company
01S01-9512-CV-00218
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint as barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff appeals this ruling. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff reported problems with swelling, pain and numbness in his right arm to his supervisor in June or July 1991. These problems occurred after using a pneumatic sander at work which plaintiff alleged was defective. He went to the company doctor about a week after he reported these problems to his employer. The company doctor advised him that his problems with his right arm were the result of his use of the pneumatic sander and further advised him to forever avoid using vibrating tools with his right hand. Plaintiff continued to have the same problems with his right arm and experienced exacerbations of his pain whenever he used a vibrating tool. He continued to see physicians, by referral from defendants and on his own. No proof was offered as to whether the defendants had paid any medical expenses for the plaintiff in relation to his alleged injury within a year of his filing this complaint in March 21, 1994. The trial judge held that there was no question in the court's mind that the plaintiff had known since June/July 1991 that he had a work-related injury and that the action was dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. Our review is de novo on the record, accompanied by the presumption that the factual findings of the trial court are correct. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225 (e)(2). TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-23 provides: The right to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law shall be forever barred, unless within one (1) year after the accident resulting in injury . . . occurred the notice required by _ 5-6-22 is given the employer and a claim for compensation under the provisions of this chapter is filed with the tribunal having jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter; provided, that if 2
Coffee County Workers Compensation Panel 09/05/96