Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

Appellate Court Opinions

Format: 08/28/2014
Format: 08/28/2014
02A01-9502-CV-00018
Court of Appeals 05/21/96
02A01-9502-CV-00024
Shelby County Court of Appeals 05/21/96
02A01-9509-CV-00207
Shelby County Court of Appeals 05/21/96
02A01-9511-CH-00255
Court of Appeals 05/21/96
03A01-9509-CH-00303
Court of Appeals 05/21/96
03A01-9510-CH-00347
Court of Appeals 05/21/96
03C01-9204-CR-00125
Hamilton County Court of Criminal Appeals 05/21/96
03C01-9508-CR-00220
Blount County Court of Criminal Appeals 05/21/96
01S01-9507-CC-00104
Supreme Court 05/20/96
02S01-9508-CV-00069
Supreme Court 05/20/96
02S01-9601-CV-00134
Supreme Court 05/20/96
03C01-9502-CR-00049
Sevier County Court of Criminal Appeals 05/20/96
03C01-9506-CR-00162
Greene County Court of Criminal Appeals 05/20/96
01A01-9510-CH-00481
Davidson County Court of Appeals 05/17/96
01A01-9510-JV-00474
Davidson County Court of Appeals 05/17/96
01A01-9510-JV-00479
Davidson County Court of Appeals 05/17/96
01A01-9601-CH-00030
Davidson County Court of Appeals 05/17/96
02C01-9404-CC-00082
Henderson County Court of Criminal Appeals 05/17/96
02C01-9309-CC-00201
Court of Criminal Appeals 05/17/96
02C01-9409-CC-00193
Madison County Court of Criminal Appeals 05/17/96
02C01-9504-CC-00114
Madison County Court of Criminal Appeals 05/17/96
02C01-9508-CC-00227
Madison County Court of Criminal Appeals 05/17/96
Gary Reatherford v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc.
01S01-9504-CV-00058
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff was doing construction work at the Lincoln Brass Works facility, moving the employee break room from one side of the building to another, when a nail flew into his right eye, requiring several surgical procedures and resulting in total permanent loss of vision in the eye. The trial judge found that he was a statutory employee of Lincoln Brass Works and held the company liable for 1 percent permanent disability to plaintiff's right eye. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The only issue before us is the status of the plaintiff for workers' compensation insurance purposes. The plaintiff contends, and the trial judge held, that he was a statutory employee and Lincoln Brass Works was a principal contractor (statutory employer) under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-113. Lincoln Brass Works contends plaintiff was either an independent contractor or a casual employee. Under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-113(a), "A principal, or intermediate contractor, or subcontractor shall be liable for compensation to any employee injured while in the employ of any of the subcontractors of the principal, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor and engaged upon the subject matter of the contract to the same extent as the immediate employer," (commonly referred to as a "statutory employer"). This court has consistently held that where a business enterprise undertakes to act as its own principal contractor and contracts directly with a subcontractor for various phases of construction on its own premises, the business enterprise is subject to liability imposed by the Workers' Compensation Act. Acklie v. Carrier, 785 S.W.2d 355 (Tenn. 199). Lincoln Brass asserts the construction workers were independent contractors rather than statutory employees under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-113(a). The factors to be considered in determining whether a relationship to the principal was that of employee or independent contractor include: (1) the right to control the conduct of 2
Wayne County Workers Compensation Panel 05/17/96
Gary Reatherford v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc.
01S01-9504-CV-00058
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff was doing construction work at the Lincoln Brass Works facility, moving the employee break room from one side of the building to another, when a nail flew into his right eye, requiring several surgical procedures and resulting in total permanent loss of vision in the eye. The trial judge found that he was a statutory employee of Lincoln Brass Works and held the company liable for 1 percent permanent disability to plaintiff's right eye. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The only issue before us is the status of the plaintiff for workers' compensation insurance purposes. The plaintiff contends, and the trial judge held, that he was a statutory employee and Lincoln Brass Works was a principal contractor (statutory employer) under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-113. Lincoln Brass Works contends plaintiff was either an independent contractor or a casual employee. Under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-113(a), "A principal, or intermediate contractor, or subcontractor shall be liable for compensation to any employee injured while in the employ of any of the subcontractors of the principal, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor and engaged upon the subject matter of the contract to the same extent as the immediate employer," (commonly referred to as a "statutory employer"). This court has consistently held that where a business enterprise undertakes to act as its own principal contractor and contracts directly with a subcontractor for various phases of construction on its own premises, the business enterprise is subject to liability imposed by the Workers' Compensation Act. Acklie v. Carrier, 785 S.W.2d 355 (Tenn. 199). Lincoln Brass asserts the construction workers were independent contractors rather than statutory employees under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-113(a). The factors to be considered in determining whether a relationship to the principal was that of employee or independent contractor include: (1) the right to control the conduct of 2
Wayne County Workers Compensation Panel 05/17/96
01C01-9506-CC-00166
Sequatchie County Court of Criminal Appeals 05/16/96