Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

Appellate Court Opinions

Format: 03/31/2015
Format: 03/31/2015
K.K., v. The Paul Revere Life Insurance Company
01A01-9511-CH-00541

Plaintiff K. K. appeals from the trial court’s judgment granting the defendant, The Paul Revere Life Insurance Company ("Paul Revere") his motion for summary judgment, and the failure of the trial court to grant its motion for partial summary judgment.

Davidson County Court of Appeals 06/07/96
Page G. Stuart v. State of Tennessee Department of Safety - Concurring
01-A-01-9601-CH-00033

This appeal involves a judicial review of administrative proceedings before the Commissioner of Safety seeking the release of property seized by law enforcement officers pursuant to T.C.A. Section 53-11-451.

Davidson County Court of Appeals 06/07/96
Malcolm Yates Worley, v. Rita K. Worley
01A01-9601-CH-00037

This is a suit and countersuit for divorce in which the wife was granted an absolute divorce on grounds of inappropriate marital conduct of the husband. On appeal, the husband presents issues which relate only to identification and division of the marital estate: The parties were married in 1958 and separated in 1995. Both parties worked during the marriage. Their earnings were approximately equal. There are no minor children.

Hickman County Court of Appeals 06/07/96
Teresa G. Bradford v. Donnie R. Bradford
01A01-9603-CH-00121

On May 16, 1996, appellant moved this Court to rule that this cause is properly before this Court.

Montgomery County Court of Appeals 06/07/96
Jerry T. Beech, Concrete Contractor, Inc., v. Mary Henderson
01A01-9507-CH-00308

This case concerns the payment on a contract for installation of a concrete driveway. Jerry T. Beech Concrete Contractor, Inc. (hereinafter, "Beech") filed suit against Mary Henderson (hereinafter, "Henderson") on a sworn account for nonpayment of the contract price for installing a concrete driveway and a box drain. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that Beech and Henderson had contracted to install a driveway and a box drain, but the trial court determined that Beech had installed the driveway in an unworkmanlike manner causing it to have defects. As a result, the trial court awarded Beech the contract price offset by the amount of property damage Henderson allegedly suffered. Beech appealed, and the appeal is properly before this Court. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Court of Appeals 06/07/96
William Richardson v. Murray Ohio Manufacturing Company
01S01-9508-CV-00130
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the plaintiff 15% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The defendant below appeals, challenging the trial court's finding that plaintiff retains a permanent impairment as a result of his work-related injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff, 38 at the time of trial is a high school graduate. W hile moving a roll of sheet metal on June 2, 1992, plaintiff felt a sharp pain in his groin. He was referred to Dr. Robert Coble, who diagnosed a right inguinal hernia and performed a surgical repair. After surgery, plaintiff returned to his former employer, performing light duty work for a while and then returning to his former duties. Plaintiff testified that he re-injured this area in October, falling into a split. Plaintiff is now self- employed, painting and cleaning carpets. He testified that he continues to experience pain, soreness and pulling in his groin. Dr. Coble assigned plaintiff an impairment rating of 1% to 15%. He admitted on cross-examination that the A.M.A. Guides allow only a zero to five percent impairment rating for a hernia. He relied in part on the first edition of the A.M.A. Guides but testified that he considered vocational factors such as the employment activity described to him by plaintiff and the problems plaintiff described having while performing those activities. He did not place any permanent restrictions on the plaintiff. Our review is de novo on the record accompanied by the presumption that the findings of fact of the trial court are correct unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). The plaintiff must prove every element of his case by a preponderance of the evidence. White v. Werthan Industries, 824 S.W.2d 158, 159 (Tenn. 1992). Causation and permanency of a work-related injury must be shown in most cases by expert medical evidence. Tindall v. Waring Park Ass'n, 725 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tenn. 1987).
Lawrence County Workers Compensation Panel 06/07/96
William Richardson v. Murray Ohio Manufacturing Company
01S01-9508-CV-00130
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the plaintiff 15% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The defendant below appeals, challenging the trial court's finding that plaintiff retains a permanent impairment as a result of his work-related injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff, 38 at the time of trial is a high school graduate. W hile moving a roll of sheet metal on June 2, 1992, plaintiff felt a sharp pain in his groin. He was referred to Dr. Robert Coble, who diagnosed a right inguinal hernia and performed a surgical repair. After surgery, plaintiff returned to his former employer, performing light duty work for a while and then returning to his former duties. Plaintiff testified that he re-injured this area in October, falling into a split. Plaintiff is now self- employed, painting and cleaning carpets. He testified that he continues to experience pain, soreness and pulling in his groin. Dr. Coble assigned plaintiff an impairment rating of 1% to 15%. He admitted on cross-examination that the A.M.A. Guides allow only a zero to five percent impairment rating for a hernia. He relied in part on the first edition of the A.M.A. Guides but testified that he considered vocational factors such as the employment activity described to him by plaintiff and the problems plaintiff described having while performing those activities. He did not place any permanent restrictions on the plaintiff. Our review is de novo on the record accompanied by the presumption that the findings of fact of the trial court are correct unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). The plaintiff must prove every element of his case by a preponderance of the evidence. White v. Werthan Industries, 824 S.W.2d 158, 159 (Tenn. 1992). Causation and permanency of a work-related injury must be shown in most cases by expert medical evidence. Tindall v. Waring Park Ass'n, 725 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tenn. 1987).
Lawrence County Workers Compensation Panel 06/07/96
Ellers, Oakley, Chester, and Rike, Inc., v. DPIC Companies Security Insurance Company of Hartford, et al.
02A01-9501-CV-00008

This matter appears appropriate for consideration pursuant to Rule 10(a) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.1

Shelby County Court of Appeals 06/04/96
Anne Adams Hurdle, by and through her Attorneys-in-Fact, Walker Hardy Hurdle, III and William F. Hurdle, and Walker Hardy Hurdle, III and William F. Hurdle, Individually, v. William W. Dunlap, Jr and Wife, Mary Ann Hurdle
02A01-9502-CV-00023

This matter appears appropriate for consideration pursuant to Rule 10(a) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.

Shelby County Court of Appeals 06/04/96
State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom - Concurring/Dissenting
02S01-9502-CR-00014

I fully concur in the majority’s decision affirming the conviction in this case. I also agree with the majority that the trial court’s refusal to admit into evidence as mitigation the testimony of Dr. John Hutson was error which requires a reversal and a remand for re-sentencing. However, I dissent from the majority’s analysis of the constitutionality and sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating circumstance, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5), as amended in 1989.

Jackson County Supreme Court 06/03/96
State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom AKA Otis Smith - Concurring/Dissenting
02-S-01-9502-CR-00014

I fully concur in the majority’s decision affirming the conviction in this case.  I also agree with the majority that the trial court’s refusal to admit into evidence as mitigation the testimony of Dr. John Hutson was error which requires a reversal and a remand for re-sentencing. However, I dissent from the majority’s analysis of the constitutionality and sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating circumstance, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5), as amended in 1989.

Shelby County Supreme Court 06/03/96
Ira H. Murphy v. Board of Professional Responsibility
02S01-9503-CH-00031

The issue raised by this appeal is whether the petitioner, a disbarred attorney, has satisfied the requirements for reinstatement of his license to practice law contained in Rule 9, § 19.3, Rules of the Supreme Court, by clear and convincing proof. A Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility concluded that the petitioner had failed to carry the burden of proof for reinstatement. The Chancery Court, however, reviewed the Hearing Panel decision and held the petitioner was entitled to "conditional reinstatement" of his license to practice law.
 

Shelby County Supreme Court 06/03/96
State of Tennessee v. Brian Keith Kimbro
02S01-9503-CR-00028

We review this cause in order to address an issue of first impression: whether attempt to commit felony-murder exists as an offense in Tennessee. We conclude that it does not and affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals reversing the appellee's conviction.

 

 

Shelby County Supreme Court 06/03/96
Charles M. Cary, Jr. v. Cathy Ann Cary
02S01-9505-CV-00035

We granted this appeal to determine whether a provision in an antenuptial agreement by which a prospective spouse waives alimony is void because it violates public policy. The trial court held that such a provision in an antenuptial agreement, which waived alimony, was valid and enforceable and, therefore, denied the spouse’s application for alimony. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, holding that the waiver of alimony provision was void as against public policy, and remanded to the trial court to consider whether to award alimony.

Hardeman County Supreme Court 06/03/96
Michelle Lynn Durham and husband, Robert Wayne Durham, v. Luther Well an wife, Sue Well, individually and D/B/A Webb's British Petroleum Station and W. Paul Arnold, individually and D/B/A Arnold Construction Co.
02A01-9502-CV-00033

Michelle Lynn Durham and Robert Wayne Durham (“plaintiffs” or by name)1 brought this suit in the Circuit Court of Gibson, County against Luther Webb and wife Sue Webb, individually and d/b/a Webb’s British Petroleum Station (“defendants”),2 seeking damages for defendant’s alleged negligence that caused plaintiff Michelle Durham to fall in defendant’s parking lot, causing injuries. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, from which this appeal is taken. The sole issue presented is whether the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We find no error and affirm.

Gibson County Court of Appeals 06/03/96
State of Tennesee v. Mario Lamont Wilson
02S01-9505-CC-00045

A jury convicted defendant, Mario Lamont Wilson, of three counts of aggravated assault and of felony reckless endangerment and possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to commit a felony. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Wilson’s felony reckless endangerment conviction and sentence, but reversed and dismissed the convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a deadly weapon. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it dismissed Wilson’s convictions for aggravated assault.1 Although we conclude that Wilson’s convictions for aggravated assault may not stand, we do not adopt entirely the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Rather, we affirm the dismissal of the aggravated assault charges because the evidence is insufficient to prove that Wilson intentionally and knowingly caused another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury.

Madison County Supreme Court 06/03/96
Lillian D. Vega-Horta, et al., v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories Company, et al.
03A01-9706-CV-00226

Plaintiff, Lillian Vega-Horta (“plaintiff”), appeals the judgment of the trial court granting defendant’s, St. Mary’s Medical Center (“St. Mary’s”) Motion for Summary Judgment. For reasons state hereinafter, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Knox County Court of Appeals 06/01/96
01A01-9505-CH-00218
Court of Appeals 05/31/96
01A01-9512-CH-00562
Warren County Court of Appeals 05/31/96
Vicky v. Klein
01A01-9601-CV-00043
Davidson County Court of Appeals 05/31/96
02A01-9410-CH-00232
Dyer County Court of Appeals 05/31/96
02A01-9411-CV-00255
Shelby County Court of Appeals 05/31/96
02A01-9412-CV-00269
Madison County Court of Appeals 05/31/96
02A01-9412-CV-00269
Madison County Court of Appeals 05/31/96
The Recent Case of Gene v. Aaby v. Judy Aaby Strange, ____S.W.2D____,
03A01-9511-CV-00403
Bradley County Court of Appeals 05/30/96